1: Garrett B-4, 5 (no. 1855) 1891
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grove and alleys, and celebrate their religious rites with great rejoicing and festivity. The women in their gayest and richest dresses, their necks and heads hung with strings of silver coins, and with either a scarlet feather or a posy of roses or anemones in their turbans, dance with the men in rings, sometimes to the number of two hundred. The young girls make the most of their holiday, dancing to their hearts' content with their admirers or affianced lovers.

The large Kurdish tribe of the Dooljiks, which is composed of several *thirjés*, forms another heretical sect, called Kizilbakhs. They regard Ali, the first Khalif, as the personified Deity, thus attributing to him, as do the Ali Ilahis of Persia, a much higher position than to the Prophet of Islam. And there is yet a third description of sectarians, called Bektáshi, who regard Ali as the latest manifestation of the Deity in human form. The more mystical among Moslems hold that all the great Prophets who have appeared from the creation of the world—Adam, Abraham, Moses, Elias, Christ, and Mohammed—were successive incarnations of the Divine Spirit, and that the founder of Islam, because the last, was the greatest. But the Bektáshi ignore Mohammed entirely. According to their saying, "He (the Deity) has showed Himself in a thousand ways, and many are in doubt; if he would show Himself in one way, many would believe." Warlike and unruly as are the members of this sect, the American missionaries have been very successful among them. Such, indeed, is the influence of this handful of men from the New World that they

1: Garrett 3--4, 5 (ca. 1860) 1891
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have persuaded some of the most turbulent, whom the Turks have never been able completely to subdue, to lay down their arms, and relinquish their trade of rebellion, robbery, and murder.* 742 777 777

* Henry Consul Taylor, Asia M. Geog. Soc. vol. xxxv. p. 25, who also says that the Kelat claims to be the descendants of Shamma, or Samma, son of Samanhuth, who, with his brother Ashmahit, fled to Samma (south-east of Lake Van), after having murdered their father at Nineveh, and founded three dynasties, one of which was that of the Sammeans, or Sammas. See also Rose of Khorat, i. p. 103, n. p. 145; and the Geography of the Translated Version to St. Martin, i. p. 230, referred to by Mr. Taylor, loc. cit.

and it is important not to confuse the ideal of the intellectual nationalists, a free Kurdish commonwealth, with that which the chieftains and their people are now striving to preserve, a society quite unlike the state.

The Kurds, occupying a mountainous terrain, were but superficially governed by the Iranian and Ottoman governments. Inasmuch as the roads were poor or the country impossible for artillery, the Kurds, a well-armed people, were usually the military equals of their governors. The control of the Iranians and Turks was thus largely confined to the maintenance of police posts and army installations and the attempt, often in vain, to maintain public order and collect a few taxes. Helmut von Moltke, writing in 1838, notes:

> It is a well-known fact that the Ottoman empire comprises vast regions in which the Porte exercises no real authority. It is certain that the Padishah (the Turkish Sultan) has to reconquer widespread regions within the territory of his own state. To this category belong the highlands (of Kurdistan) between the Tigris and the Persian frontier.[1]

In recent decades, however, the Kurds, notably in Iraq and Turkey, have been subjected to the full impact of the modern state and some remarkable changes, comparable to similar developments elsewhere in the Middle East, are beginning to take place, challenging the whole structure of their society. This last, as will be seen, is one which is at once tribal and feudal, formerly directed by a landed aristocracy. A

[1]Quoted in Sefrastian, 1948, p. 39.

characteristic of it was its extreme decentralization. The Kurdish tenant or tribesman has now suddenly discovered himself to be a citizen, and the Kurdish chieftain to be without his former economic or political power. A new class, that of officials and officers, has been introduced with an unfamiliar system of society, and the result has not been without conflict. The fact that the reaction has been linked with European nationalism makes it the more interesting. The second object of this study is the delineation of this religion, and a consideration of the alterations in Kurdish life since Ottoman times. The recognition that nationalism, commonly considered in the Middle East as a European ideology in new dress, may be paired in some instances with economic and social upheavals of a different order is a matter of great importance in the analysis of the area.

The Kurdish population of Iraq has been estimated at about 400,000, although figures vary considerably, and occupies the mountainous areas north of Mosul, northeast of Erbil, and east of Kirkuk. In many instances their villages have spilled out on the flat expanses of Upper Mesopotamia. A small portion of this populace is nomadic, wintering their flocks in the same plains area, and seeking the pastures of the uplands in the summer. Kurdish Iraq provides a striking contrast to the sun-baked flats and deserts of the central and southern provinces. The terrain is rugged, with peaks reaching 8000 feet above sea level, and is characterized by precipitous heights, deep gorges,

route, a path unsuitable for vehicles, but still used by the villagers, and several tracks lead off to the villages on its rear. Kawandus proved itself advantageous for an initial investigation of Kurdish culture, for it has a basic population of merchants and landowners whose life is considerably richer and more complex than that of the poor farmers and shepherds. To obtain the most complete portrayal, of course, a desirable supplement should be obtained from the villagers and the nomads in future work. In relation to the second problem, however, the impact of the state on Kurdish society, Kawandus was ideal, because it was in the town that the new class of society, that of the government officials and officers, had replaced the few Ottoman officials and the first signs of change could be observed. The first object of this study, then, is the analysis of Kawandus as an administrative and commercial center and Kurdish life as it is to be observed there. The second object is the determination of the way in which the imposition of a new order of society has affected the Kurds.

distinction for robbery and bloodshed, and certainly a part of the usual income of the old chieftains was derived from the exaction of "tolls" or outright kidnapping, either of persons or of goods. Just as revenge in a blood feud was one of their outstanding duties. The introduction of better roads and the adoption of modern equipment by police and army here, although questionable, lessened greatly the frequency of these things, and the contemporary brigand —they still occur—finds himself heavily outgunned. In spite of this unsavory reputation, particularly for revolt, the Kurdish minority of Iraq cannot be said to be the most lawless in the country, for the Muntafiq Liwa, a "Marsh Arab" province, is frequently cited as the worst. Although the army may be called upon in exceptional cases, normally the prevention and detection of crime is the work of the police, and their direction within the qada is charged to the gaimmaqam.

Service with the police is quite popular among the poorest classes, particularly among those of the "Marsh Arab" provinces, because, although the pay is extremely small, it is accepted as a substitute for military service and, as a career, offers an escape from agricultural drudgery. Officers are attracted to serve just as they might be to the army or the civil service, and are commissioned after graduation from a special school. They are usually derived from poorer middle-class families and have had a secondary education. There is thus quite a social gap between an officer

and his Burmah dress comfortable. Enlisted men and non-commissioned officers of the police are furnished their uniforms, rations, and quarters, although those who own land in the country may live in private dwellings with their families. The duty uniform of the police consists of a forage cap with a black cloth patch sewed on its front to which a silver badge is pinned, a shirt and tunic with metal buttons, short trousers, wrap-around puttees, and heavy army shoes. The cloth is of olive drab wool in the winter and khaki drill in the summer. The dress uniform, which includes a spiked helmet, encountered in England and other larger towns, is never seen in Kawanaka. Officer's uniforms differ only in that they are of better quality. Long trousers may be worn, and a sun helmet may be substituted for the cap. Ranks and insignia are much like those of the army, following--with an Ayshin terminology--a British model. The arms of the police, also like those of the army, are the British Enfield rifle for enlisted men and the Webley service revolver for officers. The police and army officers alike have a great predilection for swagger sticks, ranging from slender bamboo to heavy pieces of wood bound with leather. The Kawanaka police detachment has at its disposal several light American vehicles equipped with water-cooled machine-guns and a number of lorries.

The police are assigned in small numbers to the [illegible], while a larger unit is kept in Kawanaka at the

another one of a Muslim Turkish family. Enlisted personnel include a large number of conscripts assigned there for training, many of them "Gayrik Arabs." Uniforms and equipment, like organization, are derived from the British army, and the army has, of course, a greater variety of uniform arms, as well as equipment, than the police. It might be thought that the district would gain from the supply of such a unit, but most of the rations are brought in by lorry from the quartermaster depot in Erbil. The details of training [illegible] are not concerns us. It is a common sight, however, to see a company of infantry struggling up a mountain-side in extended order, and in the summer the valleys may resound with artillery practice.

Officers, when off duty, have free pass to Kuwaitdue, and it is from this fact that they exercise an important social influence in the town. Enlisted personnel, excepting those few non-commissioned officers who have homes there, are not permitted in Kuwaitdue save during the daylight hours of Friday. It is some testimony to their desire for diversion that so many make the long climb to the town on Friday, simply to sit in a shop where they can drink tea, talk, and play at backgammon (tawli is colloquial Iraqi Arabic). Military police patrol the streets of Kuwaitdue, not only on this day, but throughout the week. However, enlisted men have much freer access to Tawlikha, the small collection of houses and a mosque, which marks the site of old Kuwaitdue beneath the bluff, and there is a

although the farmall is extraordinarily overpriced, brought a decline in the variety and quality of craftsmanship in Kawaukwe. Newly enslaved and imported by the Kamangonjia, a man who saw status to purchase such things as gold jewelry for his wife must travel to Brazil.

It must be admitted that the strength of the town as a center based on village trade is precarious, and much of the commercial activity with importance in district economy has been replaced by service to the government personnel and the several wealthy landowners who reside within it. In brief, the economic realignments of the first world war have changed the bases of the size and importance of Kawaukwe. Once these were primarily commercial, and only secondarily political, while today a reversal of this position has taken place. The increased influence of the government, which is a matter of numbers, into everyday life has introduced into the town a new income without whose supplement Kawaukwe might have experienced certain decline.

information, it would be difficult to assign such a [342] [774]
power plan to any definite cultural horizon, but the
architectural attempt to surround the women in closely [343] [777]
intimate, and, while it had its initial expression under
the Arabic caliphates, probably had its greatest influence
in Byzantium under the Turks when such things were carried
to an extreme, at the same time reinforced by the prestige
of a ruling class, in most parts of the Ottoman Empire.

The entrance of the house requires special atten-
tion, for certain important customs surround it. The
outer are of heavy timbers, swinging on iron hinges, and,
having a metal knob, are bolted at night with a heavy
wooden bar which is kept in place by a second piece shown
in as a pivot. The outer doorway may have a fuel lamp for [371]
night and in many cases is furnished with charms designed
to ward off the evil eye, a belief which will be dis- [767] [777] [781]
cussed in a later section. These are characteristically
a blue porcelain plate, embedded in the mud wall-surfacing,
or a pair of old shoes hung on a nail. The popular reason-
ing behind the second device is that it indicates to a
person with the eye that "your malevolent glance is as
powerful as our pair of old shoes," an explanation that
probably has little to do with the origin of the custom.
Whenever the construction of a house is completed, the new [342] [782]
owner sacrifices an animal, a sheep or a goat, by cutting
its throat before the door and smears some of the blood
on the doorposts and the threshold. Often he dips his [751] [771]
hand in the blood, and applies it to the door, making by

Indoors, in a private home, a person dressed in this fashion may discard his turban, placing it on the neck beside him, wearing only the cap. In his own house, particularly during summer, the neck, jacket, and outer trousers are also removed. As far as headdress is concerned, few townsmen remain completely uncovered except when sleeping, and the cap is worn, with or without the turban, a large part of the day.

Several persons in the town wear the Arab style, a *kishtaiha* (colloquial Arabic of Iraq), a full-length garment of wool or cotton buttoned at the neck, and a single turban of a single scarf would flatly shout the stranger. Over the *dishdasha* is sometimes worn the *'aba* or *bisht*, a loose-fitting outergarment usually with short, full sleeves, worn in cold weather and decorated with a thicker border of gold and silver thread. The *mulla* or town priest always wears this garb. In contrast to Arab garments, the innovations in recent years of European cotton pajamas, obtained from the tailors or from Erbil, has been marked. These are worn over the undergarments and are for lounging rather than sleeping. Some of the youths wear them on the streets, and an older student in pajamas and a European cloth jacket is not an uncommon sight in a *chaikhana*. They are not, however, considered polite outdoor attire for persons of dignity. In winter the townsmen put on few unique items of clothing, unless they possess a European overcoat, and bundle up in additional shirts, vests, and

Sak

the like underneath the conventional outer garments. [77] ●
[91]

Civil officials wear European clothing, discarding the sandals during the summer. A summer effort the black wool foreign cap instituted by King Feimel I. to replace the red helmet of Ottoman association, rather than the usual European headgear, was others go bareheaded. It is interesting that some Turkish officials of higher rank prefer the European felt hat, merely worn by most civil servants, and this is taken as a tacit sign of what may be termed the "Turkish resistance" to Arab rule. For [Sak]
dress active, the official discards himself of his outer garments but puts on pajamas or the kirbiwiche, the waistcoat, and replaces shoes and stockings with open-toed leather slippers of the Sefendis type, these last are generally used by the townsmen. Schoolboys wear a curious mixture, the characteristic garb consisting of a cloth European jacket, a shirt buttoned at the neck, and the baggy white cotton trousers worn by adults as underdrawers. It remains [91]
to notice that most wardrobes in the town contain a great variety of second-hand clothing of all types, Arab, Turkish, and European, and these appear according to the taste or resources of the wearer, particularly for indoor use. Many costumes thus seem to be motley in appearance, because almost any garment is passed through the family until finally worn out. Similarly, much is transmitted from the wealthy [91]
to the poor, for clothing is a favorite benefice at the [79]
time of a festival or great occasion, such as the birth of a son, aside from everyday bequests. The servant of an

a matter of social status, and many women, flattering themselves, will bite their nails although their station does not warrant it, to the amusement and sometimes the disgust of others. One noticed from a distance that an elderly woman of the lower class turned against a wall and concealed her face from bright light of flashes. "The old fool," he said, "she thinks herself still a girl." The uncommon or wealthier looked never appear in the streets unveiled, and the old, heavy covering of thinner linen has been replaced completely by the lighter pareu, derived from the Arab cities. This garment is easily formed by knotting together two corners of a large piece of black cloth so as to make a tight circle at one end to the dimension of the head. This circle is placed around the skull with the knot at the nape of the neck and the whole cloth is tossed backwards, covering the hair and hanging down over the shoulders and back. The forward edges can be controlled with the hands and thrown across the face whenever necessary. Within their homes, most women use a simple headcloth, usually of white gauze, which falls over the shoulders and hangs to the waist, and, just as the men, are infrequently without something on their heads. Among the Europe, however, it is a much greater shame for a girl to have her legs observed by a stranger than her face.

The rich garments of a wedding or the festival, particularly in wealthy houses, are of much the same type, with the addition of a few items and the better quality of

One curious fact gradually dawns on an American observer, 825
that almost no one is ever heard whistling, and one of 593
the reasons elicited is that it is supposed to attract
snakes. A few lizards are found in the houses and their 736
value in ridding the rooms of insects is recognized. An
object shot of the genie disappears, and their acceptance is
prominent in the warmest days of summer. A large percentage 169
of the townspeople do not consult the medical officer for 798
their ailments, and, coupled with the deficiency of infor-
mation in the hospital itself, it is thus difficult to
arrive at any exact answer to the question of health. In- 65
fant mortality appears to be high, but as individual who
pass adolescence seem to have excellent chances of
reaching old age. The number of men in the town vigorous 887
at sixty, seventy, and eighty years is surprising. Ma'ma
Effendi was considering a second marriage at sixty, to re-
place the one who had died [at the age of eleven 'of the [764]
evil eye'], and Shukir Effendi led an extremely active
life at eighty-five, waking up and down the steep steps
of the town eight times each day. Dysentery troubles al- 164
most everyone, and there are a few cases of malaria every
summer. Most housewives have a series of remedies for 757
everyday complaints, but it cannot be denied that a 759
physician who commanded the respect of the townspeople
would find himself most welcome.

In concluding this section it may be observed that 777
there have been a number of changes in household life since

the first World War, but they have been more in the substitution of the materials used and in the addition of new items rather than anything radical. Most of these are European, such as kerosene stoves and shoes, and have either displaced older manufactures, some of which survive, or have been readily accepted as new devices. The Kurd, is no innovator, but welcomes new things of a material sort, particularly if they appeal to him as ingenious, as the cigarette-lighter, and are integrated without difficulty into his daily life. It cannot be maintained that the increase of European imports has destroyed the self-sufficiency of the household or of the district, although it has certainly furthered the deterioration of native crafts, for this area has utilized trade from other locales for centuries. In general, it might be said that the last fifty years have seen the introduction of many new means to the same ends. An imported kerosene stove and cooking utensils are now used to prepare food, but the diet and the etiquette of dining have changed little. The sewing machine and fabrics from the mills of Great Britain now provide clothing, but the costume, save for European shoes, is much the same. A drastic reorientation has not been necessitated by the introduction of these new appearances, and household life in Rowanduz can be said to have evolved, and to still be evolving, into something which daily makes increased use of the devices and products of European civilization with great stability.

177 [176] [439] [433]

economic wealth has been cut from beneath them. In an ideal situation, they may survive only as landowners and as they are able to obtain positions in the government. The situation, however, is far from ideal, and in practice many continue as their forebears, side by side with the new competitors. It cannot be denied that they accord the government considerable aid in the maintenance of order, and, at the same time, provide it with great anxiety in their private warfare and political thought. 565 [178]

This Kurdish aristocracy is by no means feeble in the face of such competition, and has the advantage of popular support and sympathy, particularly, as has been seen, because it represents a highly idealized group. It has been said that the Kurds are easy prey to doctrinaire philosophies, specifically Communism, but among them, save in certain of the well-educated, there is no knowledge or sign of what may be called a "class struggle," or, in older terms, the rich or privileged against the poor. The struggle is strictly between Kurdish society as a whole and what they consider an alien system. The investigator has talked at length with a number of dissatisfied Kurdish youths, as well as others in whom such sentiments might be expected, and has heard much of "good" chieftains and "bad" chieftains, but never the aristocracy condemned as such. It must not be thought that the speech of this aristocratic group is "reactionary," in the sense of opposition to modern innovations and the desire to return to older ways. Such things as automobiles, modern firearms, wirelesses, and 565 668 177 146

any technical device within their means have been assimilated with alacrity. European and American medical goods are eagerly sought, and there is almost a childlike faith in the wonders of the Western World. "We can," said an effe, "make of this area a Switzerland of the Middle East." The less well-informed, whose knowledge only extends to the Mediterranean, say the same thing, having reference to Lebanon. Insofar as family life is concerned, the Kurds, comparing themselves to the Arabs, point with pride to their "more enlightened" treatment of women in terms of the veil and social intercourse, but one is dubious of any wider extent of this liberality. In short, the Kurdish aristocracy represents an extremely active class, untroubled by most aspects of Westernization, but weakened by their own dissentions and threatened by the encroachment of a new government. It seems impossible, in view of so many variables, to predict whether or not they will be able to maintain their integrity.

Inasmuch as they represent the first system in which the only significant division is between aristocrat and commoner, the Kurdish chieftains of the Rowandus area are often uneducated and wear the national costume as it has been described in the preceding section. Only a moderate number from this group have obtained higher education and have subsequently entered the government service. Many, indeed, are illiterate and have no knowledge of Arabic, the language of the government. In Rowandus only three aristocratic houses are represented, those of Isma'il

highly ranking civil servants and officers never take refreshment in the chaykhanas or worship in the town mosques. They do not visit the homes of the townsmen or attend their festivals, although, being men of substance, they may send gifts to their Kurdish neighbors on such occasions. The dividing line is to be found in the teachers, who constitute something of a separate group, looked down on by the higher officials and officers and flattered by the townspeople, perhaps, to some extent, because they exercise great control over the destinies of the sons of the town. It is possible to observe a teacher in deep conversation with some respected merchant in the bazar. One must digress to report that one of the teachers in Rowanduz fell in love with and married a girl of the town, undistinguished either in the wealth or the occupation of her father, much to the delight of her parents and against the advice and scorn of his colleagues and superiors. This created an anamolous, almost unheard-of situation, breaking down, as it did, the barrier between "educated aristocrat" and commoner, and the teacher is still subject to criticism, not solely on the part of the official class, although he shares much more extensively than his fellows in the social life of the townspeople.

565 571 647 [431] 875 571 565 626

One of the most salient characteristics of the official class is that it considers itself, with some justice, to be the most "progressive" not only in Kurdistan but in Iraq at large, judged, to a large extent, in terms

647 565 177

of a college or university education and the relative degree of Westernization. The officials and officers are all graduates of colleges or academies, either in Iraq or abroad, where many images of Western civilization are often literally enforced on them by their fellow students. It would be difficult to describe fully the details of this influence, but it may be summed up in what, with certain reservations and qualifications, they consider to be the dress, mannerisms, and thought of a Western gentleman. Thus they wear European clothing, indulge in gaming and drinking (which, one might note, despite Islam, are by no means strangers to the region of the Middle East, save that in this case specifically European forms are encountered), and, in general, try to comport themselves in their work and in masculine society as their models abroad. There are a large number of reservations, a few of which may be enumerated here. The attitude of an Arab official or officer toward his womenfolk, in a rural setting, is, if anything, more stringent than that of the local aristocrats. None of the officials would consider appearing before other males naked[1] or "indecently" clothed, and almost all consider European toilet habits filthy in the extreme, water being thought far more hygenic than tissue. A large part of the passion for Westernization stems from a sincere desire, as they envisage it, to better their country, while in others it amounts to pure snobbery. In the latter category, one can often hear officials, speaking

[1] [should read: naked. —Analyst]

with each other in Arabic, heavily interlard their speech with English and French words and phrases. The official class can, with legitimacy, claim that it is the more progressive and better educated, but, as if to drive a wedge between itself and its subjects, the adjective baladi, "rustic," is used with fluency and condemnation. As this new "civil elite" continues to assert itself at the expense of its parallel, the landed chieftains, both Kurd and Arab, Westernization has become one of its distinctive marks.

Thus thrown back on themselves for these reasons, the distinctions between Arab and Kurd, and between educated and uneducated, and their insistance on "distance," the officials and officers have of necessity created a social life of their own, exclusively masculine. A private home in the upper part of the town, whose garden overlooks the gorge, was subsidized as a nadi or "club." This building is of a single storey, built on three sides about a flagged courtyard which forms the garden, and encloses only several rooms. Its previous occupant had been an educated effendi whose hobbies were the occult sciences, and he decorated the walls with snakes and other symbols in paint which might lead the uninformed observer to erroneous conclusions in the realm of popular religion. One of the rooms was furnished with chairs and benches, much as a diwakhana, another had a table and chairs for cards, and a third was utilized as a kitchen. Two of the townsmen were hired as servants. In the club one might purchase tea, sherbet, and,

The heart of the matter is to be found in the distinction between a society governed by the state and one ruled by tribal or feudal chieftains. The state is no stranger to the area of the Middle East, for it was in this province that it probably made its first appearance and some of the more complex bureaucracies of history were evolved. Nevertheless, there are certain places, Kurdistan among them, where it is a newcomer, and others, such as Saudi Arabia, where it has yet to appear. Ottoman control in Kurdistan was rarely strong, and was characterized by a sort of daily contest between the scattered authorities, supported by their troops and gendarmes, and the local inhabitants in matters of tax-collection and recruitment for the army. Beyond the borders of Turkey and other well-organized districts, the Ottoman Empire was largely oriented for tribute, the enrichment of its officers and the Sublime Porte, and the Turks, aside from their inroads and the prestige attached to conquerors, did little to tamper with the economy and the social structure of their subjects. Rowanduz, before the first World War, was led by its aristocrats and its merchants, and the meager representation of Ottoman rule was regarded as an everyday annoyance which could be circumvented, bribed, or ambushed as the occasion demanded. Insofar as the Turks were satisfied with what little money and recruits they were able to collect, they were not considered greatly detrimental to life.

The rise of the modern state in Iraq provides in places such as Rowanduz, good examples of the impingement

2: Masters E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11
Rowanduz
Ma'dan MH12

of a new system of society on one that is older. At the beginning of this section, these two systems were outlined, the "primitive" one headed by a hereditary aristocracy and the "civilised" one by an educated group which includes property-owners, professional men, and a government cadre. The first is represented in the Rowandus district by the Kurdish chieftains and the second by the officials and officers of the central government. The second system is not wholly strange to the area, for the Turks, and perhaps others before them, conditioned the Kurdish populace to the concept of alien rule, if such control was only desultory. The new monarchy, however, first in British and later in Arab hands, introduced a strong administration, something quite new, which, despite a series of revolts, penetrated almost all phases of popular life. This, as has been seen, has resulted in the displacement of the local aristocracy, a process which has been completed in some places and in others is only beginning. The same conflict, with varying results, can be observed elsewhere in Iraq and in the Middle East. Among the "Marsh Arabs" of the southern provinces, for example, there is a bitter conflict between the local shaykhs and the government in matters of land ownership and the collection of taxes. The "Marsh Arabs" also have a record of revolt, and, like the Kurds, have had many of their chieftains imprisoned or exiled, such as Shaykh Salim of the Bani As'ad tribe, still in exile at Baquba.

K 619 648 177

M 648 423 651 669 619

Rowanduz, as a minor administrative and mercantile center, stands almost midway between the agricultural village and the great city. Its populace is divided into three groups, the Kurdish aristocrats, the townsmen, and the official class. It is here, rather than in the villages, that the displacement of the aristocracy is more clearly in evidence. In Ottoman times the divisions of society were stabilized. There was little motive or means for the son of a townsman to become a civil servant, although this occasionally took place, and it was impossible, as it still is, to become an aristocrat. The addition of the officials and officers of modern Iraq, a "new elite," and, in particular, the institution of schools which makes entrance possible, has radically altered this arrangement. It is now theoretically within the reach of any townsman to have a son enter the ranks of the official class, and it is for this reason that they insist so avidly on the education of their heirs, placing high hopes on their success in the schools. Strictly speaking, the society of the town is disjointed, for the townsmen continue to regard the official class as alien, and have adopted little of their dress and manners. On the other hand, they have been quick to realize that the new system offers an opportunity for social advancement and are eager for their children to take advantage of it. In short, the townspeople have been absorbed into the second system, although the first continues to operate elsewhere in the district,

as in the case of Mahmud Beg of the Bandost who rules as did his forebears, and must be counted as a factor in everyday life. It is thus that one finds a duality of thought and behavior as far as the two aristocracies are concerned. A landowner in Rowandux spoke of the chieftains as though they were the only important element in society and, at the same time, alternately praised and castigated two of his sons for their respective success and failure in school. The youth who had failed was regarded as a great disappointment, a condemnation which would not have occurred fifty years ago when the upper echelons of society were either inaccessible or unconnected with the prestige and power of the new servants of the state. 177 585 632 624 [867]

pagan, have largely been forgotten and whose harmony is unimportant. 771

If the account of contemporary religion is related to that of Ottoman times, little can be found which indicates that this is an area of change. The chief complaint of the amateur theologians was not of increasing impiety, but rather of unorthodox practices, and this conflict of puritan with popular religion is centuries old. One striking omission may be denoted, the lack of condemnation of the government elite for gambling or drinking, two diversions prohibited by the faith, in which the townspeople find no interest. In seeking to define those places in which the collision of the modern state with Kurdish life has evoked conflict, it is curious to find that the forbidden amusements of the officials and officers are not used in the criticism of the new order which they represent. However, alcoholic beverages are not retailed openly in the town and the government elite amuses itself in private. It is possible that the exclusive atmosphere of these parties, together with the new and unfamiliar prestige of the officials and officers, overrides possible defamation. Similarly, the most articulate demagogues of Kurdish independence are drawn from the official class and, insofar as they think of themselves as "progressive" like their Arab colleagues, they remain silent about such matters. It was not possible to determine whether or not the revolts of the past were partially phrased in religious terms, but it

177 771 [688] [273] 668

to the state, private persons, and the Islamic faith, and the regular collection of taxes. If the land is unregistered, it prefers to obtain the revenue directly from the users, and, if privately owned, from its legal holders. The Arab government of Iraq cannot be said to be a model of efficiency, but it has quantitatively superimposed an administration far different from that of the Turks or the chieftains. 65 [423]

If the changes of the last fifty years which have taken place in Kurdish life are reviewed, it cannot be said that any one aspect has been static, but in one the alteration has been far greater than in others. Aside from the society, the areas of discord are few in number. Items of Western technology have been easily assimilated, and it is not possible to allege that any self-sufficiency has been destroyed by the introduction of manufactured goods, for this dependency on foreign products has apparently been known for centuries. The specialization in tobacco in the district has, of course, conditioned versatility, but it has been profitable rather than detrimental, and, in any case, the agricultural production of the area, even at a primitive level, is only a part of its potential. In the house and its furnishings, the costume, the diet, life within the family, and religion almost nothing of a structural nature has been altered or replaced. The locus of modification, then, has been in the economy and the society, for, not only has a new class, the government elite, been added to compete for prestige with the native aristocracy, 177 [439] [249]

but the whole structure of society, tribal and feudal, which was only lightly touched by Ottoman rule has been challenged by the modern state. 667

Coupled with the impingement of the state, represented by the monarchy of Iraq, has been the question of Kurdish nationalism. The concepts of this movement are clearly a European importation. They were learned by educated Kurds, officials, officers, and teachers, of the late Ottoman Empire, probably from similarly-affected Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, and other subjects of the Sublime Porte. These Kurds, drawn from the higher ranks of Ottoman society, carried nationalism to the people, and something of their success is indicated by the fact that it is difficult to find a Kurd in the rural areas who is not voluble in political matters. Nationalism, with its extravagant vocabulary, found easy listeners in the Kurdish aristocracy. If their administrative functions were to be usurped by the government and the economic exploitation of the commoners eliminated, the chieftains were to become superfluous, although perhaps none of them said this explicitly. The Kurdish aristocracy, whose lives had been oriented around the vendetta and who led a well-armed population, reacted differently than the impotent noblemen of Tchekov's Cherry Orchard or Keyserling's Abendliche Hausser. The first general revolt under Shaykh Mahmud took place in 1922 and the second in 1930. A third occurred in 1932, and the last, that of Mulla Mustafa, at the close of the second World War. 668 668 669

it has had a new class added to its society, that of the officials and officers, and, more than any agricultural village, has been absorbed into an unfamiliar system. The government elite of the town are on an equal footing, as far as prestige is concerned, with the local aristocracy and enjoy the advantage of having the real power. Already certain changes, which might have been anticipated, are beginning to take place. A few merchants in the town have adopted the European dress of the official class, and men are determined that their sons, if humanly possible, will be educated and take a higher place in the new hierarchy of society, something previously impossible. It is in Rowandus, then, that a new social structure is being realized as it is elsewhere, for example, among the Marsh Arabs of the southern provinces. It is one of the state of Iraq, rather than the tribal and feudal system which is characterized by the absolute difference between aristocrat and commoner. At present, the contest between the government and the Kurdish nobility has only been partially decided, but, failing some major event, it seems probable that the Kurdish chieftains will be eliminated as a distinctive class and be able to save themselves only as landowners and participants in the new regime.

The relevance of the second object of this study to ethnology is not that it has formulated something new or unique, but that it supplements the large body of material already gathered on the transition of primitive into

342
333
351

Fig. 20. Loggia with columns made of slim, barked poplar trunks with pieces of wood inserted as capitals. Topzawa.

and the window frames sometimes come apart from the clay walls as the latter smoulder so much that large gaps appear. During dust storms doors and windows become more and more loose. 342

Two phenomena are typical of the Kurdish village houses of a certain size. The one is the central living room, sometimes placed on the first floor, the floor beneath being used as a stable. This central room, *hayvate*[11], looks like a huge niche in the body of the house for it lacks the fourth wall thus becoming a cool, shady apartment during the hot part of the year[12]. The second phenomenon are the columns, often with pieces of wood inserted as capitals. The pillars are formed of slim, barked poplar trunks[13]. The three-walled room is possibly a Kurdish version of an Islamic architectural element, whereas the pillars can trace their ancestry back to Iranian-Achaemenidian architecture which is known as far east as Uzbekistan[14]. Cellars are unknown. The underground living room, *serdâb*[15], typical of Arab urban architecture, is not found in Kurdish buildings. [197]

The houses in the villages are built on hill slopes so that they often have two storeys to the front and only one at the back. As previously mentioned, they are usually built together and provide accomodation for several families. The way up to the flat roofs is nearly always by narrow ladders[16] made of thin poplar trunks with rungs of rounded sticks or pieces of a tree trunk. Inside stair from the ground to the first floor are very rare in villages; where they do occur they are made of clay with

a ledge forming the exterior edge of each step. These steps are exceptionally high and uneven[1]. Some of the houses in Sulaimani in which I had an opportunity to live were built of unfired clay bricks, others were made of fired bricks which nowadays are being increasingly adopted. Most of them had only one storey and the same flat clay roof as in the villages. When the clay brick walls are replaced by walls of fired brick, the clay roof was retained, though without the projecting eaves, as walls of burnt brick did not require the same protection from the winter rain as do clay walls. The two-storeyed houses had a stairway which, with high steps, led direct from the courtyard to the first floor, where the family rooms were situated—an Iranian architectural element—which was found repeated in a house made of sun-dried clay brick in the village of Sargala, incidentally its most distinguished building, the residence of the sheikh.

THE FUNCTION OF THE DWELLING

Having reviewed the practical side of the dwelling's construction, we shall now proceed to its form and function as the framework of woman's life within the four different feminine environments.

As an example of the residential frame surrounding the women of the village aristocracy, Sheikh Ta'fir's property in the village of Topzawa will be taken, and for that of the ordinary peasant woman a quite small house in Balkha. The two urban environments, the "educated" and "uneducated" were found within the walls of a single home, that of my interpreter's family at Sulaimani. The picture of that house will be supplemented by features from other dwellings in that town and in Kirkuk, inhabited by women representing both strata.

Sheikh Taffir's home at Topzawa is occupied by the family itself consisting of husband, 42 years old, wife, 40, three sons, 18, 15 and 6, two daughters, 17 and 8, a daughter, 12, of another wife now returned to her home, and, more or less constantly, the husband's younger brother, about 35, a co-owner of the property. There was also a servant girl, about 25 years old with two children, a 4 year old daughter and a 2 year old son. As a tenant of a room that had no entrance into the house was a poor widow with several sons who, however, were not at home when I was there—a total of 13—15 persons. As opposed to the other village houses, which lay in terraces on the slope of the hill, the flat clay roofs of the lower houses forming an open space in front of those above them, Sheikh Taffir's house lay by itself. It was built of sun-dried clay brick on a stone foundation, plastered with a mixture of straw and clay. The roof was of poplar trunks with the addition of brushwood covered by a thick, hard-packed and rolled layer of clay. The house had six different levels of flat roofing. It lay close to a slightly sloping, unlevelled piece of ground on the outskirts of the village, a little above it. A watercourse, which even in the hottest summer never ran dry, passed alongside the back wall of the property, and water from it was diverted through the wall into a cemented basin, about 2×1×0.75 metres, lying in a small garden, with an outflow under the wall.

The property was divided into three contiguous units: the family house, the farm and the guest wing. The family house was orientated like an urban house with stock and hulu houses around a court. Four high, irregular steps led from the court to the dwelling house, which, on account of the

6: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Hard MA11

in drawers in the dining room or bedroom in manifestation of the home's economic standard, were kept in this room, which then became more a treasury than a bedroom. The articles of value not locked in there were carried on the person in the form of jewels. Wealth was hung on oneself and not impersonalized in the form of a costly piece of furniture or a valuable painting. This explains the striking contrast between the expensively clothed, bejewelled women and their remarkably bare homes.

The flexibility of the Kurdish home must also be viewed in relation to the prevailing sleeping habits. To sleep was a family affair[1], (unless a married couple withdrew to one of the other rooms). There was no undressing when going to bed or lying down to rest on the quilted-out mattress. The women slept in the same clothes they had worn during the day, with the exception of the turban of the married women, which was replaced by a light veil tied round the face and neck. The men slept in their home clothes, which might be pants and shirt, or, in the case of the more modernistic, who followed the customs of Baghdad, pyjamas—though not in the sense of a garment for the night. In Baghdad and in the provinces the Indian pyjama had returned, via Europe, to the Near East as a day and home garment. In Kurdistan it became day dress which was kept on when one went to bed. Nor was there any special morning or evening toilet. Ablutions were performed in order to reach a ritually-pure state, and were, like most of the daily life, closely connected with the demands of Islam. The greater or lesser washing of the body whereby one reaches a ritually-pure state, prior to prayer, is hardly personal hygiene as we understand it. Mouth, nose and hands were carefully cleansed after each meal, and the genitals were washed each time nature had been relieved, simply described by my interpreter as "to go to the water". When prior to the five daily prayers the small ablution, must be performed, which comprises the washing of face, hands, forearm and feet, and then passing the wet hand over the hair, not to mention the big cleansing of the whole body that must be done, for example, after menstruation or sexual intercourse[2], there is no need for any further morning or evening toilet.

Clothes were changed during the day if an urge was felt to do so, or if it was considered that the clothes one had on had become dirty or were not fresh enough. The term "going to bed and getting up" thus had nothing to do with dressing and undressing.

The lighting, even in so large a house and with such a numerous family, was confined to a big pressure lamp and a couple of smaller "kitchen lamps". The larger lamp hung during the day on a nail in the wall of the central room, and when darkness fell it was placed as a luminous centre of the family circle where this had "pitched camp", whether on the roof, in the courtyard, or in the central room. The lamp was placed on the ground or on one of the small, angular smoking tables. As lighting it was garish and most inadequate, which did not seem to worry the people who were able to work in the cookhouse by the light of a fire, or to wait at the garden basin in the evening by the light of the moon or the stars, and whose eyes were not accustomed to adequate light from several sources. One was quite used to being, and performing the evening tasks, in semi-darkness when outside the radius of the crude light from the lamp. In the shop house of the village schoolmaster sporadic European elements could be found: mirrors, battery wireless receivers with velvet covers (only heard on the

wages from the work at the Dokan dam), wrist watches, sun-glasses, nail varnish, lighters, tooth brushes, tin-openers, and gramophone.

A quite small house in the village of Sulikha has been chosen as an example of the house round the hill of the plain peasant women. In it dwell a young couple and a daughter 3 years old. This house was neither built of natural stone with short horizontal beams, nor was it detached, being a part of several houses joined together and intended for several families. It was so sited against a steep slope that the building had two stories to the front, with the goat stable in the lower and a dwelling in the upper, to which there was direct access by a path from above. The roof was of the flat, clay-covered type, with a base of poplar trunks. The upper storey consisted of only one room closed by a heavy wooden door, plus a loggia, the floor of which formed the roof to the goats' stable. The rear wall was of natural stone along the side of the mountain. The roof was supported by a single poplar trunk at the outermost corner of the goats' stable. During the summer, the only room of the house was used as a locked store room in which was kept the family's harvest of dried mulberries and what the family owned in the way of kitchen utensils and metal and wooden chests. In the hot weather the family lived on the roof, the loggia above the goats' stable. This loggia had a wall of brushwood at the entrance edge, with the result that, in front of the winter room, it was something between a loggia and a leaf hut.

The clay roof was not only hard-packed and rolled but also glazed with a mixture of clay and chalk, a Sulikha peculiarity. This treatment of the roof had to be renewed each year and glazed anew every time water was spilt upon it. Glazing was women's work and was performed in team work, each taking it in turn to help the other. There was absolutely no furniture in this cellar—life was lived on the floor, on the rug rolled out on the roof, and on the mattresses covered with flowered cotton placed along the wall which were used to sit on, the cylindrical pillows acting as back rests. Coon is quite right when saying: "One can be just as comfortable and dignified on the floor as in the chair"[7]. Cooking and baking facilities consisted of a cooking pit in the rear corner of the loggia outside the door to the only room in the house. Here the cooking pots and the convex, circular iron sheet, tell or saw, on which the bread sheets, nan, was baked were placed on the fire. The cylinder-shaped oven was not used here, close to the Iranian frontier. Water, with the possibility of washing the person, clothes and household utensils, was not found in the house or its immediate vicinity. Some distance away among the terraced houses against the hill was a covered, cave-like washing place with common facilities for the women of the village. However, it was stated that the water course—not a spring of open stream—which fed this "wash house" was so impure that it could not be used in the household. Drinking water then had to be fetched down in the valley—a climb of more than half an hour—from a waterfall in a wood. Here a small basin had been made of natural stone where the women could wash themselves and their clothes when down to fresh water. The latrine in the house was the goat stable. Churning was done with the churn sack suspended from a tripod. Access to the roof, where one slept on mattresses devoid of sheets, was at night closed by leafy branches, so that neither the grey, long-haired sheep-dog nor cattle from the mountain track could find their way in.

The buttermilk remaining, that is, whey mixed with water, is called *dûg*. It is a beverage inferior to ayran, but is used daily as a thirst-quencher and a drink between meals. It is nutritious and very refreshing. In the villages it is kept in a leather receptacle similar to the churning sack and, like the latter, closed by a wooden cord around the neck; it is hung up in a shady spot, for example the gate of the courtyard, to cool.

For the cooling of milk/dûg in Sulaimani clumps of snow, kept in pits in the mountains, are used. In the summer this is brought down to the town and sold in the market[1]. In the villages the drink is offered to guests in a common bowl and drunk with the help of a big, carved wooden ladle, *kawlik*[2], (L. 22cm), about 0.30 cm. long, of which 0.12 m. is a deep scoop with flat, perforated handle. *Dûg* can be cooked with whole grains of wheat into a porridge, whereafter the liquid is allowed to drain away by spreading the mass over a coarse woollen sack. This mass, stored in a leather sack, can be kept for the winter (seen at Bekhal).

The making of tea. In the part of Kurdistan in which I stayed coffee was not drunk. A copper coffeepot, tinned outside and inside, with a beak-like lip and lid and handle of brass 0.19 m. high (fig. 22[3]), was bought in a second-hand shop in the city in Sulaimani; it was a foreign (Arab) element which I never saw in use. At certain intervals along the highroads were a *kayabai*, a tea house, where one could stop and be served with tea, *çay*. The making of tea in the home will be dealt with apart from ordinary cooking, as tea besides being a necessary refreshing beverage with which meals ended, was made expressly for these occasions, is also offered to guests[4], and in the evening constitutes both a stimulant and entertainment. The preparation and serving of tea conforms to a definite pattern.

As a rule one particular woman in the house attends to the making of tea, sitting cross-legged on a small sheep skin, straw mat or felt rug, *Mekûl*, (L. 229cm) about 1.30 - 0.75 m. In front and around her within reach she has all the requisites for preparation and serving. The chief object is the pear-shaped samôvar of pewter or brass[5] standing on low legs and filled with water. A huge pair of pincers is used to lift the cylindrical *kanyas* with glowing embers from the earth oven, from the cookhouse, or with charcoal heated on a flat, corrugated iron basin with short legs. At the base of the samovar's interior is a grid. A small chimney is placed on the top of the samovar and it remains there until the water boils, when it is replaced by a small china teapot, in which, with the help of the boiling water, a relatively small quantity of very strong tea is brewed, sufficient, however, to form the basis for the innumerable glasses of tea to be served in an unending sequence to those present. At the side of the samovar stained tea glasses about 8 cm. high with uppermost flowered saucers and spoons[6] lie in a tin bowl. The glasses and saucers were purchased in the city in packages of 12, and were said to have been imported from Czechoslovakia. These small glasses are half-filled with tea from the teapot and then filled up with boiling water from the top of the samovar, each glass being sweetened with granulated sugar (equivalent to 2 lumps of sugar) from a tin, or with loaf sugar broken into pieces on a cloth by a special sugar hammer[7]. A bowl with three lumps of sugar is also passed round[8]. The tea glass, saucer and spoon are rinsed in a bowl with boiling water every time they are to be used. When a tea glass is empty, it is finished and a fresh one brought until one places the glass down on the saucer as a sign that no more is desired.

CHAPTER III

APPEARANCE

Women's dress. The appearance of Kurdish women is created by her dress, her jewellery and beauty culture. For the prosperous the dress materials are: silk, artificial silk, brocade, satin and velvet. Light colours for the young, dark for their elders. The predominant colours are crimson, purple, turquoise, rose and green. Woman's dress, *libs*, consists of elements essentially Kurdish in form and composition, elements connected with Islam, and elements introduced from Western culture.

Kurdish elements. Trousers, *dwal-i-rish*, (E. 2333, E. 2339) are about 1 m. long and about 2.30 m. wide at the top. Here they are gathered with a casing and run on the hips. At the extremities each trouser leg is 1.15 m. wide and gathered around the ankles[1] with a draw string. From the point of view of cut they are legging trousers[2] with an inserted square gusset 0.25 m. × 0.25 m. The upper part of the trousers is of white cotton material, the lower part of coloured cloth of, say, cotton, taffeta or brocade[3].

Shift or petticoat, *Zir-i-rish*, (E. 2334) is about 0.90 m. long with large arm openings and large, round neckline, identical front and back. The width above is 1.20 m., below 1.70 m. so that it does not tighten when the woman sits tailor fashion. It comes down over the knees hiding the upper, white section of the trousers. The material is shiny, coloured artificial silk.

The gown or kirtle, *kras*[4], (E. 2335, 2340, 2338), is 1.20 m. to 1.30 m. long and drags along the ground. In cut it is a pocket gown[5] with inserted side gores, small circular neck line with short vent[6]. The sleeves are 0.40 m. wide, attached to the body at right angles and ending in funnel-shaped cuffs, the length of which, is 0.85 m. to 1.10 m. These cuffs are pulled out through the sleeves of garments worn on top in cold weather (coat or mufjar, or both) and wound around the under arm. In warm weather, when there are no outer garments, the cuffs are tied in a knot at the points and thrown over the back, leaving the sleeves open and half-length[7]. During prayer the tied cuffs are undone so that they hang out over the hands, the tips reaching the ground. The material of the kirtle can be dark, flowered cotton or patterned chiffon. During work the kirtle may be shortened by being pushed down half-way under the casing of the trousers.

The waistcoat, *xezmi*, (E. 2336, E. 2341) 0.36 m. to 0.40 m. long and 0.40 m. broad consists of two bodice fronts and one back, joined by slanting shoulder seams and straight side seams, or cut out of one piece of material here in from each side so that it only has the slanting shoulder seams. It has big, enlarged armholes. The material is cotton or brocade in strong colours, lined with white cotton.

[P.65]
[TEXT CONTINUES TOP of P. 68--ANALYST]

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

embroidered velvet slippers with built-in heels, *qundîl* or *pâpuš*, (E. 2349) about 0.25 m. long. In both types the right and left foot are identical. European footwear of "Bata"'s make, from high-heeled black patent leather to summer shoes, was also seen. Women who were much in the mountains used discarded, down-at-heel men's shoes of European manufacture. 291 [297]

Elements connected with Islam. External garment and veil. In Southern Kurdistan in the form of cloak and face veil, *abâ* + *pêšî*, which completely concealed both the face and body. 292

The face veil, *pêšî*, (E. 2332) is rectangular, 0.46 m. × 0.45 m., made of thin, black, honeycomb-woven, gauze-woven silk. The two top corners of the veil are fastened together with a pin before being placed over the head. It hangs down in front of the whole face.

The cloak, *abâ*, (E. 2331) is rectangular with two horizontal shoulder seams 0.65 m. long. It is 1.70 m. long and 1.55 m. wide. Uppermost in each corner there is a vertical slit 0.10 m. long to allow the hands to be passed through. The cloak is made of two lengths of heavy, black silk material, 2.85 m. long and 0.85 m. broad, assembled by a seam running across the finished garment. In this fashion 291

[TEXT CONTINUES TOP OF P. 75 --ANALYST]

Fig. 59. Woman wearing the black veil and the black cloak, *abâ*, dressed for leaving the house. Babilonsk.

[292] [352] [381]

Fig. 60. Diagram showing the cut of the *abâ* (E. 2331). One side left open. The dotted lines indicate the cut. Scale 1:30.



4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

the cloak is purchased ready-made in the city. At home the workers serve in a tank along the transverse seam. This tank is narrowest behind and in front, but broader at the side. This adjusts the garment to her height and stops it trailing at the sides. The cloak is lifted over the head, outside the veil, and pinned round the body, the woman's hands from inside grasping the front edges. The garment covers the woman's body from below to feet, completely hiding the dress below it. 291

Loose from Western culture. Long nightgown with padded sleeves and sometimes an appurtenant jacket both of rose silk. Is used as home dress. Is sewn at home or bought ready-made. Evening dresses and summer dresses, knee-high of a style illustrated in fashion journals during the summer of 1957. Either purchased ready-made or made at home in the form of complete dressy or blouses and skirts. Wedding dress of white satin, long with long sleeves, embroidered with spangles. Bought ready-made in Baghdad. 291 [719]

Distribution of the elements of women's dress. Within the four female environments dress schemes were composed of elements of all three groups: the specially Kurdish, the Islamic, and the dress loans from the West. These dress schemes varied additionally in the case of unmarried and married women.

Village aristocracy. The dress consists of the following Kurdish elements: trousers, shift or petticoat, gown or kirtle, waistcoat, jacket, caftan and head veil, the last always white for an unmarried woman, and, for married women, also shoulder cloth, neck veil, shoulder cloth, turban cloth and brow cloth worn under the head veil. At home the married woman often dispenses with the last mentioned articles of dress. The materials are velvet, brocade, chiffon, voile and artificial silk. In addition, exceptionally, coarse silk tulle for the kirtle interwoven with metal thread, and painted nylon from Japan. All imported goods come from Europe, particularly France, from Syria and from Japan. 369 525 291 [439]

It is typical of the dress scheme that more or less clothes are worn to suit the temperature, but that there is no set costume that varies according to the occasion. A woman of the village aristocracy in the sheikh's house in Topzawa rolled out dough still baked in wordpris-green brocade trousers, satin petticoat of the same colour, and black tulle kirtle with patches of gold thread. She milked the goats clad in similarly magnificent materials. The best clothes were the newest and least worn. As mentioned earlier (p. 37) women do not undress to go to bed, but sleep with all their clothes on, their heads swathed in a cloth. The sole articles of clothing not worn in bed are the turban, the neck-shoulder cloth and brow cloth, that is to say the parts of dress connected with the turban. Kirtle, shift and trousers could be washed and sometimes were, but the character of the dress does not make it imperative that it should be newly-washed or ironed. Cleanliness in regard to dress was non-existent. We must return to European periods like the Baroque and Rococo to find a similar dress effect based on magnificent material, which retained its splendour despite use, and the fact that no attempt was made to clean it, which latter would be considered essential in modern Europe. The long, wide trousers were always worn under the kirtle, the shift also. Only the padded outer pieces of clothing were put on or taken off in winter or warmer weather. 291 [513] [296] [171]

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

peculiar to that village, is always used by the peasant women on their way to the fruit plantations at Tawella. My interpreter told me that the women considered it indecent to show themselves without this bundle on the back, an attitude similar to that found in Europe in the days of the bustle. During work in the fields I saw a kind of apron in use. This consisted of a large piece of canvas wrapped round the body, the two upper corners being tied together over the left shoulder. A similar protective apron was worn in the village of Derkan whilst threading tobacco leaves on a string. Another type of dress I discovered was worn—so far as I was given to understand—by new arrivals in Topzawa, and was a little contemptuously described as "Persian dress". This was also a trouser costume, but comprised of an extra long kirtle lifted up over a low-sitting belt with metal furnishings consisting of a large and several smaller silver buttons[1]. No turban was worn with this dress, but a hood with two long flaps that hung down the back. In the same way the head jewellery, a triple chain of coins, was of a different type from that worn by the other women in the village. It was stated to be typical of Hawraman[2]. As with the village aristocracy the plain peasant woman dons the black veil and *abā* when visiting towns.

The educated urban environment evinces a highly heterogeneous picture from the point of view of dress[3]. If I review the various dress types in which my interpreter appeared in the course of our four month cooperation, it will serve to explain what I mean. Her two most important articles of clothing, without which she never left the home, were, as for other urban women unlike the women in the two village environments, the black face veil and *abā*. Under this her dress could be a costume composed of genuine Kurdish elements, in composition quite like the daughter's dress in the aristocratic village milieu, except that the material and light colours that were exceptional in villages here were the rule. In addition she always wore a belt round her waist, a thing worn only exceptionally by young women of the village, whilst at the same time retaining as usual the trouser casing round her hips—an arrangement she transformed to European panties which she rolled down over the hips, never wearing the elastic round her waist. At the same time, like her teacher colleagues, she showed a tendency to prefer kirtles of coarsely-woven tulle so transparent that they disclosed the fashioned European petticoats which in this female environment had replaced the loose-sitting shift. Her married colleagues did not wear the turban arrangement and their jewellery was worn in the form of a chain (E. 2293) placed along the edge of the waistcoat or as a belt around the waist. Under the black *abā* my interpreter might have a long rose nightgown with or without its appurtenant jacket, her home and sleeping dress. Inspired by the European nightgown, this article of clothing, like men's pyjamas, is not in the Kurdish dressing scheme specially a night garment, but is worn all round the clock—a European garment adopted to Kurdish custom. She might wear blouse and skirt or a complete dress tailored or ready-made in precisely the same style as the European-American, though, in accordance with Kurdish custom, it was also slept in. In this educated urban milieu the "white bride" dress had also been adopted. At their weddings both my interpreter's sisters wore a long white wedding dress with a short white veil. The underwear that went with it was also European except that garters were worn instead of a girdle. This adoption of European dress elements meant a breach of the normal pattern: that day

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

291
292
585
177
352
142

Fig. 63. European wedding dress (cf. p. 77,133). Educated urban environment. Sulaimani.

369
29
177
[832]

and night dress were identical. To a bride's outfit in an educated milieu belonged a satin house coat and a nightgown intended solely for use at night, which presupposes undressing. In this milieu were also found brassières and even artificial breasts of foam rubber, plus European type panties, though these were made at home out of highly-coloured cotton material.

The following is typical of the educated urban environment:

The upper garments connected with Islam are the most important dress elements. The Kurdish elements are retained but are only used now and again. Dresses are degenerating in regard to material, and also appeared to be in course of dissolution in regard to their composition. Headdress has been abolished and the belt introduced. Of European elements both blouse and skirt have been adopted, plus summer and wedding dresses. In one instance I saw in Sulaimani a short European shoulder-less part of the caftan is twisted together and placed like a bundle over the loins. This way of carrying it,

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11.

291 369 177

evening gown being worn by a Kurdish lady at afternoon tea. It is typical that European dress enters the Islamic woman's world whilst the occasion for which it was designed is lacking.

The uneducated urban environment. In this milieu also the Islamic elements, face veil and head cloak, are the most important, obligatory outside the area of the home. Under this dress, and in the home, a costume is worn composed on exactly the same lines as that worn in the two village environments. As regards the material it is characterized by the use of both the velvet, silk and brocade of the village aristocracy and the cotton materials of the plain village woman, in the uneducated urban environment mainly worn by the elderly. In this milieu, as in the two villages, the turban and its accessories are customary for the married woman, whilst the unmarried only wears a head veil.

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Fig. 64. Ordinary peasant environment. Halabja.
Fig. 65. Uneducated urban environment. Sulaimani.

291 516 [863] 192 301

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

89 11

The "Kurdish elements" of women's dress viewed in a larger context.

Area	Illustration	Examples in the National Museum of Denmark	Trousers	Unbelted	Kirtle	Waistcoat	Belt	Collar	Turban	Headcloth	Apron
Egypt	Lane 1964, 42ff., 48ff.		+		+		+	+	+	+	
Arabia	Musil 1928, 122, 125				+		+		+		
	Dickson 1951, 134ff.	F. 343, 45-47 (Qatar)	+	+	+			+	+	+	
Syria and Palestine	Jessin 1934, 481ff., 501		+	+	+	+	+	+	+		
	Dalman 1937, figs. 42, 88, 89				+				+	+	
		F. 440a-h (Hama)	+	+	+		+		+		
		F. 453 (Hama)			+						
Iraqi Kurdistan	Cf. Edmonds 1937, 87ff.	E. 2333–37, E. 2339–48	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Armenia	Bishop 1891, II, 242, 351		+	+			+	+			+
		M. 409a–d	+				+	+			+
Turkey	Pentzer 1936, 168ff.		+	+		+	+	+	+		
Turkish Kurds		M. 413a–d	+			+	+	+			
		M. 558a–c	+				+	+			
		M. 563a–f	+	+		+	+	+			+
Iran	Chardin 1711, IV, fig. facing p. 158, no. XXIII		+		+			+			
		E. 1474	+		+			+		+	
	Fowler 1841, I, 136. II, Title picture		+		+					+	
Iranian Kurds	Aristova 1958, fig. 1, 3, pag. 226, 235		+		+				+	+	
Bakhtiaris	Bishop 1891, II, 117		+		+						
Lurs	Feilberg 1952, 120ff., figs. 111, 112, 114	E. 346–51	+		+				+	+	

As appears from the table, where an attempt has been made to compare the main elements of Kurdish female costume with that of a similar nature in surrounding areas, the visible trousers of genuine Kurdish dress correspond to those worn in all adjacent territories. The same applies to the kirtle, with the exception of Turkey and Armenia. The long pointed sleeves characteristic of the Kurdish kirtle is paralleled by the costume worn by Arab bedouins and, particularly, in the Syrian-Palestinian dress, from which these sleeves can be presumed to have been derived. The waistcoat of Kurdish women is probably a loan from Turkish costume. The caftan is an accessory to female costume in all regions. The Kurdish tribes in Turkish and Armenian areas are influenced by the kirtle-less dress of

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

Turkish women and the Armenian costume with apron, respectively. Kurdish female dress is most closely paralleled by the older form of Persian women's costume (cf. E. 1474). According to Bishop (1891, I, 214) the ladies costume in Persia has undergone a great change in the last ninety years, that is since about 1800. The later type of Persian female dress with narrow trousers and "hollow" shirt is a quite different type (cf. E. 2235).

The Luri in Iran, visited and described by Fellberg, have the same type of trousers-kirtal-caftan costume, with a turban like the Kurdish, though the trousers are narrower and less visible than those of the Kurdish costume in Iraq (cf. Fellberg 1952, 119, 121, figs. 111, 112, 114).

Elements of woman's dress and their distribution.

Groups	Elements	Village aristocracy		Peasant women		Educated urban		Uneducated urban	
		unmarried	married	unmarried	married	unmarried	married	unmarried	married
I	Trousers, shift, kirtle, waistcoat, jacket, and caftan	×	×	×	×	(×)	(×)	×	×
II	Cap, neck cloth, shoulder cloth, turban, and brow cloth		×		×		(×)		×
III	Head cloth	×	×	×	×	(×)	(×)	×	×
IV	Sash or belt	(×)	(×)	(×)	(×)	×	×	(×)	(×)
V	Footwear	(×)	×			×	×	(×)	(×)
VI	Face veil *abd*	(×)	(×)	(×)	(×)	×	×	×	×
VII	Cotton material			×	×			×	×
VIII	Silk, artificial silk, and brocade	×	×		(×)	×	×		
IX	Dress changes					×	×		
X	European garments					×	×		

×: The element appears constantly everywhere.
(×): The element appears sporadically.
I: Is used in all environments by both unmarried and married. However, is not constant in the educated urban milieu.
II: Is the head dress of the married woman in all environments. Not constant in the educated urban milieu.
III: Is supplementary to the headdress of the married woman and constitutes the sole headdress of the unmarried girl. Not constant in the educated urban milieu.
IV: Only constant in the educated urban milieu.
V: Not constant in the village aristocratic milieu or in the uneducated urban milieu. Completely lacking in the humble village milieu.
VI: Street dress in the two urban environments and worn by village women when away from the village.
VII: Used mainly in the common village and uneducated urban environments.
VIII: Silk-brocade is characteristic of the village aristocracy and educated urban environments. Can on occasion be met with among married women in the humble village milieu.
IX-X: Dress changes characteristic of the educated urban milieu such as European frocks.

4: Hansen E:5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

291
294



Fig. 66. Demonstration of how a certain length of material is cut out to form the different parts of a woman's kirtle. Scale 1:30.
a: the body; b: the two sleeves; c: the two funnel-shaped cuffs (one of them sewn together from two pieces); d: the four side gores; e: the two rectangular gores in the armpits. (Cf. fig. 51).

294
[439]
177
[463]
[804]

The production of feminine garments. The materials for all women's dresses are machine-made and imported[25] from abroad for sale in the *sūq* of the larger towns. (Samples of brocade, E. 2352a–c). The padded garments like jackets and caftans are made by bazar tailors with Singer sewing machines that are found in both town and village[26]. Certain main measurements are taken of the customer, height and shoulder breadth. This is done with a measuring rod, *gēz*, (E. 2272). This is a round stick, 0.535 m. long, divided into English inches by circular notches, and consists of two sections, bound together by a cord, that can be inserted into each other. I did not witness the cutting-out of a caftan or a jacket.

Sleeveless jackets, trousers, under-kirtle and kirtle are made by hand or on a sewing machine by women at home. Except in the case of sleeveless jackets, nothing is wasted when cutting out these garments. All the parts of which the garments consist are limited by straight lines and utilize most ingeniously the available material (see diagram). Material is purchased in definite measurements, well-known to the bazar tailors. When cutting-out the kirtle the person's height is measured with the material. The smaller measurements are marked on the material by taking the distance between the thumb and little finger several times and the distance from the nose to the finger tips with an outstretched arm (1 yard). Feilberg[27] writes of the Lurs measuring by means of the hand, just as Danes at one time used the end joint of the thumb and the length of the foot.

[804]

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

302 *Beauty culture.* Women's hair is cut short at the side of the head in line with the mouth. Older women in the two village environments and in the uneducated urban milieu wear their back hair long, plaited in an unequal[33] number of plaits. The cutting off of the side hair has led, in the case of the younger women of the village aristocracy and all women in the educated urban milieu to cutting it all round the head so that the result resembles the European-American bobbed hair of the '20es. Kurdish women's [192] hair is curly and looks as if it were permanent-waved, but I never saw any woman go to the hairdresser. The women cut each other's hair and that of their girls. Women's hair is black, but ash-blonde or [386] blonde is not unusual in the case of small girls. Women often dye their hair red with *xanna*[34]. The result is a somewhat carroty tint. This is done in the case of young people and children for æsthetic reasons. On the other hand the grey hair of age is concealed by the aid of a double dye. The hair is 302 first dyed red with *xanna* produced from the dried, pulverized leaves of *Lawsonia alba (inermis)*[35], 386 which is bought in the *sûq* in linen bags ready for use (E. 2356). It is then dyed green with indigo *(Indigo fera anil)*. After 24 hours, during which time the head is swathed in a cloth, the hair assumes the desired ink-black, rather heavy, colour[36].

Henna is also used to stain the soles of the feet, the sides of the foot, the toes, and the palm of the hand and finger tips[37]. This staining I only saw resorted to in the two village environments. Within the village aristocracy this form of beauty culture is gradually becoming engaged in a struggle with [199] European-American nail varnish which, like the henna, can be purchased in the *sûq* and has also found its way to the villages. Nail varnish of whatever tint serves to emphasize the whiteness of the skin. The henna dye hides it. Use of them both results in a most unfortunate meeting between East and West, particularly when the henna dye gradually fades without at any time appearing unsightly, whilst the nail varnish peels off, as varnish remover is not apparently indulged in, giving a very slovenly effect.

302 Beauty aids also includes eye make-up, *kel*, that is to say powdered antimony (E. 2355), kept in a small brocade bag, *kel-tûr*, (E. 2354a). Eye make-up is smeared on with a small wooden stick, about 0.062 m. long, *kel-têw*, (E. 2354b-c), which is pushed over the lashes, the eye being kept closed[38].

American cosmetics could be bought in the *sûq* at Sulaimani, in the big store, Orasti Bak, and similar shops in Baghdad. A large flat velvet beauty box belongs to the trousseaux in urban environments. A bride coming from Sulaimani to a humble village milieu will be very made-up, but this is only practised on special occasions.

304 Tattooing[39], on the other hand, must be considered as belonging to the more permanent forms of beauty treatment, though it was not practised among the Kurdish women I had an opportunity of observing. Tattooing consists of single or groups of spots round the mouth, a stroke across the mouth, spots on the forehead, or the back of the hand, the inlcep or between the breasts. It was said that tattooing was performed with an ordinary sewing needle dipped in a paste of eye make-up (antimony) or soot mixed with milk[40].

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

291
531
142

Fig. 70. Left: man's dress of Rowanduz type. Right: man's dress of Sulaimani type.
Fig. 71. Men's dress of Sulaimani type. The funnel-shaped cuffs of the shirts are wound round the arms.

The elements of men's dress. Insofar as I had an opportunity to study it, men's dress in Southern Kurdistan presents a less complicated picture than women's. However, men's dress also contains special Kurdish and foreign elements. The genuine Kurdish male dress is a trouser costume[41]. Two types can be determined, each connected with a geographical area. The one was typical of the Sulaimani region, the other of the district around Rowanduz.

Kurdish elements. Shirt, *kᵛrk*, (E. 2314) is made of plain, white cotton material. In cut it is a shortened poncho-caftan[42], 0.86 m. long and a span of 1.96 m. Open in the front, it is fitted with a low collar. The shirt's breadth over the shoulders is 0.67 m. Two sleeves, 0.24 m. long and 0.38 m. wide, are attached to the shirt at acute angle. These sleeves terminate in funnel-shaped cuffs, like those known in Syrian male dress[43]. The cuffs prolong the arm by 0.34 m. and hang down 1.10 m. like long gussets exactly the same as the sleeves of a woman's kirtle. Just as with the woman's dress, these funnel-shaped cuffs are drawn out through the garment worn above the shirt, and wound around

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

is thus smooth, devoid of longitudinal creases, but after the garment is made it is decorated with green machined embroidery. The cut is the same as that of the trousers previously described, but the rhomb-shaped gusset is cut quite narrow (see diagram), so that the result is that the trouser legs are far wider. Superficially they are reminiscent of European seamen's trousers[53], diametrically opposed to the other, "peg top cut", type. On closer examination, however, it is found that the cut of the two types is identical. The narrow gusset gives a width of 0.80 m. to the bottom of the legs, as opposed to a width of 0.40 m. for the other type. The length, 0.90 m. is the same for both types and the same applies to the width at the top, which is 2.00 m.

Jacket, *kāpā*, from the Rowanduz area (E. 2322b). Of the same shape and cut as those of the Sulaimani area but, like the trousers belonging to it, made of broader-woven, smooth hempen material so that the jacket of this type is only sewn out of 6 length of material. It has no collar. Like the trousers it is embellished with green, machined embroidery along the edges. The length of the jacket is 0.70 m., span 1.72 m.

In both types of men's dress the jacket is worn stuck down into the trousers and the gathered casing at the top concealed by a long, thick and broad sash wound several times around the waist.

Sash, *pīlān*, is about 4.00 m. long, shaped like a cylinder in which a lining is inserted. This lining, which acts as a stiffener, is made of rags sewn together. On the outer side the sash can be flowered artificial silk (E. 2317, length 3.35 m.), of mauve velvet (E. 2323, length 3.09 m.), or of heavily-flowered cotton material. They are sold by hawkers in the *sūq*, for example in Sulaimani.

Footwear during the summer I was in Southern Kurdistan was European leather shoes from the "Bata" factory in Czechoslovakia, local leather, or cloth shoes, *kālāk*[54], (E. 2320). The element least connected with dress, shoes, are removed during prayers, on entering a mosque, and before treading on the rugs of the house. Cloth shoes are unexcelled for moving about in the mountains; there is no difference between right and left foot. A thick sole is formed by strips of cloth being folded together rectangularly[55], 0.115 m. long and 0.03 m. broad (E. 2274a-c) and hammered flat with a cone-shaped

[Text continues TOP of P. 94--analyst]



Fig. 75. Diagram. Cut of the jacket (E. 2316a) of Sulaimani type. Scale 1:30.
Fig. 76. Diagram. Cut of jacket (E. 2322a) of Rowanduz type. Scale 1:30.

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

291 copper hammer, 0.175 m. long, *multe*, (E. 2273)[36], tinned on the outside and ending at the top with a knob. The strips are then placed side by side and a leather strap is drawn through them making a sole which is given a crocheted upper of white cotton yarn. A piece of leather inserted into each end of the sole protects it against wear. These cloth shoes is made in the *sûq*, one man producing the sole, another the upper. In the area I visited the nicest and stoutest cloth shoes were made by the craftsmen in the *sûq* at Tawella (cf. fig. 79).

Men's headdress, like women's, is a cap with a turban cloth wound round it.

The cap, *kʷâw*[37], could be of crocheted cotton yarn (E. 2325), of black and white silken yarn (E. 2318) sewn with a pointed crown and side pieces of mauve cotton material (E. 2324), or have a flat crown and be decorated with coloured silk and gold embroidery (E. 2326) to mention a few examples. The cap or skull-cap, which is not a fez like the women wear, can be worn alone. However, to be properly dressed the cap should always be swathed in a rectangular head cloth, fringed at the edges[38], folded diagonally. This is twisted into a coil the thickness of an arm and from the man's neck wound around the head from right to left, the one end hanging down. The other end is pushed into the convolutions. The turban, the fringes of which hang down over forehead and neck, could be arranged in more or less pillow form.

Turban cloth, *mîkî* (?) or *šafta*[39], may be of cotton or silk. As example can be mentioned a cloth (E. 2319) of black and light-grey silk, 1.20 m. × 1.46 m. with fringes 0.07 m. long knotted into tassels on the two long sides. A cloth (E. 2321) of mauve and grey silk, 1.55 m. × 1.86 m. with fringes 0.07 m. long hanging loose on the two long sides. Turban cloths, known as *jamana* (E. 2327) of European black and white chequered cotton material, 1.35 m × 1.35 m. with fringes on all four sides—the same cloth that Arabs wear folded diagonally.

In addition to the male dress here reviewed a felt waistcoat, known as *fûrâjî*, (E. 2328) is worn by shepherds, amongst others. This is perhaps the "*pestek*" mentioned by Edmonds—"a felted waistcoat worn over the jacket"[40]. This felted waistcoat is unsewn[41]. It is not cut and sewn together with seams, but so-to say modelled. Its length is 0.55 m. When worn the arms protrude through holes at the arm pits, whilst the rudiments of short arms stick out like flat flashes resting on the man's shoulders.

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291 1977 *Foreign elements of men's dress.* The woolen cloak caftan, *abâ*, a characteristic feature of Arab male dress, is not worn by the men (though made of black silk, it is the street dress worn by Kurdish women). Amongst the Kurds I only saw the Arab caftan, *zabûn*, worn by a single *mulla* and a couple of old sheikhs in Shedala and Serkan. It therefore cannot be said to be a regular element of men's dress in Southern Kurdistan.

Diametrically opposed to the Arab caftan costume that hides the legs and the trousers, *libâs*[42], worn underneath, provided a loin cloth only is not worn, Kurdish men's dress, like that of the Turks, is definitely a trouser habit. This has given rise to the Kurd's nickname for the Arabs: "The trouserless"[43].

On the other hand the long Arab kirtle sewn in striped materials is included as an element of Kurdish male dress, but only as a home and sleeping garment worn above the ample Kurdish drawers. It is only seen amongst town dwellers.

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

Whereas Arab elements thus only appear sporadically in Kurdish male dress, certain European elements have been adopted. The first item of genuine Kurdish male dress to be exchanged was footwear. This was replaced by European leather shoes. In replacement of the Kurdish jacket a European jacket with collar, lapels and pocket was seen worn with the Kurdish trousers of the Sulaimani area type. But despite its form, intended to be worn outside the trousers, it was tucked down into them inside the casing and tied round with the long waist sash. Sometimes the original native jacket could be seen influenced by the European jacket to the extent that a breast pocket had been added.

In many cases a European suit had replaced the Kurdish *rānā-o-rāgā* in Sulaimani. With this a European shirt, tie and socks were worn. On the other hand, even under a European suit the baggy Kurdish drawers were retained. This is due to the custom of removing one's outer garments at home. In fact an informal visit to a café could be paid in one's underclothes[54]. Naturally the wide and ample Kurdish drawers were more suitable for this purpose than their European counterpart.

Another European element adopted by more advanced young Kurds is pyjamas (cf. p. 37). As in this cultural pattern one sleeps in the same clothing as that worn by day, pyjamas became a garment that could be worn all round the clock. My interpreter's 26 year old brother rose from his pallet in pyjamas, took his seat in the hired car that was to convey us over the desert to Baghdad, and eight hours later entered an Arab hotel in the main street of that town in the same creased attire.

In Kurdish male dress pyjamas certainly appeared to be something of an urban phenomenon. In the villages I only saw pyjamas worn by the sheikh's young son at Topzawa. The uncle, the 35 year old Mama Khala, told me that this Western habit was only about 15 years old, and that personally he was no admirer of it as it was so unsuited to the tailor's position whether on the floor or on one of the large, clumsy sofas. The son, Sardar, who favoured pyjamas, on one single occasion also wore a European suit. Apart from that occasion this dress was not worn in the villages.

Men wore no headdress with European clothes. Nor did I see any man wearing European dress taking part in the daily prayers ordained by Islam[55]. However, when men dressed in Kurdish fashion were to pray, they twined the turban cloth around the skull cap if it had been removed, and slipped off their shoes. I did not see them loosen the cuffs of their shirts as women loosen their sleeves prior to the prostrations of prayer[56]. The somewhat too-pointed, black-white or brown-white European shoes, calculated to appeal to the Oriental sense of luxury, constituted—on account of the laces that had to be loosened and tied—a breach of certain traditional habits in the cultural pattern.

Whereas women's clogs, slippers, or low cut European shoes were easy to step out of before walking on the rugs or felt mats in the home, and always lay around in a singularly unowned way outside the carpeted area—incidentally being used by all the women of the house in turn, regardless of ownership—men's European shoes were personal property necessitating bending down and loosening laces every time they were to be taken off, and tying when put on. These European shoes thus conflicted with the admirable custom that footwear should never come into contact with rugs and mats. In the same way this kind of footwear made it difficult easily to adopt the tailor's posture on the floor or to draw the legs up under one when sitting in chair or sofa. These shoes therefore constitute a step towards a readjustment of the pattern of movement and sitting habits[57].

Authentic Kurdish male dress[58], in type akin to the Turkish[59], followed the example set by the

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

854 171 tangular in form with a flat wooden base and trellised sides, so that a crate results[31], evinces the same principle as the Kurdish hanging cradle. In its simplest and most primitive form this stationary hanging cradle was brought back from the Luristan. It possesses features of both the transportable *byeška* and the stationary frame cradle. The Luristan cradle (E. 289) consists of a "rocking board" composed of two parallel pieces of bamboo to which the child must have been fastened in order to remain lying and particularly to retain the urine tube in position. The cradle has cords at each end and is suspended from a transverse pole resting on two forked sticks[32]. There are two examples of urine tubes, pipe-shaped for a male child (E. 291), and formed like an open canal for a female (E. 290). According to report they are not placed vertically as in the Kurdish *byeška*, but horizontally as in Kalmuk cradles.

Of the three types of cradles used in Kurdistan, all of which are also used in Iran, the portable one [177] seems to be a nomadic element deriving from the nomad tribes of Central Asia, the hammock cradle seems to be an Iranian-Arab element, whilst the stationary hanging cradle in a frame points towards India.

854 In the Kurdish *byeška* the child was only kept in and fastened to it at night, and in the two other types of cradle only by day as long as it slept. The child awake was carried around by bigger sisters or lay in the arms of sitting women. Out in the villages one always saw the slightly larger girls with a smaller child on their backs. Even a sick child, in one case a very sick child, is considered better placed

Fig. 91. Mother and child. Evening in a home viewed through the eyes of a 13 years old boy. Sulaimani.

[532]

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

in its mother's arms or lap than in a cradle. If a child was to be put to sleep it was sometimes during the day laid on a mattress on the floor; if it was put in a cradle it was rocked to sleep. Women in a tailor's posture could be seen to stretch out the one leg to move the cradle without losing their balance.

Nursing. According to the Coran the period of nursing is a full two years. However, it says in the Sure 2, verse 233 that "no one should be charged beyond his capacity ... If they (parents) desire to wean the child by mutual consent and (after) consultation, it is no sin for them ...". In Southern Kurdistan children whose mothers were able to do so were nursed until they reached the age of two. However, many of the women I met were unable to nurse their children themselves. The reason for this may be the lack of proteins owing to the uniform diet, of which rice was the main constituent. Milk powder was sold in the *sūq*. It was bought and used, but with poor results, as it was not mixed with sufficient care, and adequate hygienic measures were not taken. On one occasion I saw a 4 months old baby, which was suffering from what the Arab doctor called "green diarrhoea" was given in turn a milk mixture, iced-water, and strong sweet tea. From my interpreter's home in Sulaimani the sick child was taken to the hospital, where it was examined by the doctor, but the mother refused to let it be admitted to hospital. On the days following a nurse came and gave it injections against the stomach trouble diagnosed, and gave instructions concerning what the child could—and particularly what it could not—eat; but her directions were not followed. As a last measure to keep life in the baby, a woman who was nursing her own child was summoned in order that the sick baby could be placed at her breast, and on the last night the baby was alive someone was sent to this woman to obtain some of her milk. My interpreter told me that the mother of the sick baby had also been unable to nurse the previous child, which, at the time I was staying in the home, was three years old. My interpreter had kept her little half-sister alive by the help of raw yolks of egg. One was so accustomed to a high infant mortality that a child's life was not considered assured until it began to eat with adults. A certain fatalism was evinced about the death of infants[33].

As Islam permits no form of birth control, pregnancies are as frequent as the long nursing period permits. For example, my interpreter's 55 year old mother had been pregnant 12 times, though on several occasions this had been interrupted by natural abortion. The remainder had run their time, but so many of the children had died young that when I visited the home there were only three living, a son of 26 and two daughters aged 25 (my interpreter) and 23. The other wife, "my father's wife" as my interpreter called her, was 37 and had given birth 15 times. Nine of these offspring were alive: five daughters (19, 17, 16, 15 and 3 years of age) and four sons (13, 8, 6 and 4 months).

Blackman relates that in some districts in Egypt a husband is not permitted to use scent whilst his wife is nursing in order that the child shall not get spots all over its body[34]. After I had used a not very strongly-scented lotion whilst changing in my interpreter's home, it was declared that the condition of the sick infant had deteriorated because I had been in the same room.

A boy, *kurr*, is more desired than a girl, *kīč*. Muhammed, who abolished the ancient Arab custom of burying new-born female infants alive, hints several times in the Coran that male children are more desirable than female[35]. The birth of a girl in Kurdistan might cause a husband, subjected to

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd M11

In some villages there was a primary school, for example in Balkha, Serkan and Sargalu, but not by any means in all. In Topzawa and Rakawa there were no schools. Sometimethere could be a Coran school in connexion with a mosque as, for example, at Sargalu, which chilern attended until their proper schooling began. As regards school conditions, reference should be made to Longrigg and Stoakes[34]. I shall here deal with the reflection of the school in the homes where stayed, the effect of some members of the family having learned, or being about to learn, to read andwrite.

As pointed out by Longrigg and Stoakes, the acquisition of book learning is marked by the fact that the passage of both primary and secondary schools becomes "the watershed" in a community like the Kurdish. How decisive a watershed, can be seen if we observe the differencebetween working conditions in the schools arranged on the Western pattern, and in the Kurdish homes.

The school and exercise books brought home by the Topzawa sheikh's 13 year old son during the holidays appeared to be completely unadaptable foreign elements in the atmosphere of the house. In the first place there was no possibility of placing or keeping the books anywher except in the wall niches, repositories for many household articles and quite unsuited to books. Nor was there any work table in this dwelling pattern, where all work was done on the floor. In additin it was impossible to read and study in quiet surroundings, for the homes offered neither space nor possibility for private life.

In my interpreter's home at Sulaimani, I faced examples of the various trainingpossibilities open to young women in Southern Kurdistan in 1957. My interpreter had been trained as a folk-school teacher at the Teachers' Training College at Baghdad[36]. During her studies she had livedthere as a boarder. The training here lasted two years if the girl was to teach at one of the few 6 yers primary schools which were beginning to be opened in villages, and three years if she were to teach in a corresponding school in the towns. My interpreter had taken the 3 year course, and was at the time I lived in her home, a teacher at the Goizha School for Girls opened in Sulaimani in 1956. At her home I was able to see how incompatible to the family's daily pattern of behaviour was the schoolwork of her 16 year old sister, who after the summer holidays would have to pass an exam in mathmatics to complete her 3 years intermediate school. Her school and exercise books, her protracter nd ruler, lay in the wall niches all mixed up with cups, glasses, medicines; she herself sat on the flor in a corner and tried in vain to concentrate on the circles and triangles she was describing or the alculations she was engaged in. Finally she left the house. With books and drawing instruments under her black *abd* she wandered off to stay with her newly-married sister whose husband had left shorty after marriage to work in one of the villages. The whole life pattern, with two uneducated women in the house, where all contact between women took place in the home, conditions for working shool children were decidedly poor. Where, as in Sulaimani's urban milieu, girls at school are absentfrom the home for many hours a day, their home training as wives and mothers is interrupted. If the half-grown up daughters were engaged in schooling and the adult ones were teachers, as was the case at my interpreter's home in Sulaimani, all cooking, washing and washing-up for a family of 4 persons devolved, except for the holidays, on the two uneducated wives at home. In addition there was the cleaning of grain and the baking of bread which in our culture is delegated to factories.

If, therefore, the working effort of the daughters is removed from the home, an inhuman labour is

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

583 114 369 does not mention that the man must pay any bride price. Nor does it quite agree with the information Lane gives about urban conditions among Arabs in Egypt, where he lets the wedding expenses of the bride's family equal the sum paid in bride wealth by the bridegroom, but states that the money expended by the former goes on furniture, clothes and trinkets for the bride, and that all this, called "jahaz", is the bride's personal property, taken with her in the event of divorce[120], whereas he makes no mention of the bride's family presenting any form of gift to the bridegroom and his family.

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585 291 *Wedding preparations.* Of the bride's outfit the satin quilt and the quilted coats are made by male craftsmen in the bazar. On the other hand a seamstress came to the home where, under the supervision of the women in the family, she cuts out kirtles, long baggy trousers and jackets from the silk, muslin and brocade purchased in Baghdad and Sulaimani. When the material was cut out, the bride's step-mother, thus a married woman, brought a large piece of loaf sugar which, with a sugar hammer, was smashed and strewn over the material. This was said to bring good luck.

[MM] The same seamstress cut out of a roll of English grey the shirts of genuine Kurdish form and the drawers given by the bride's family to male relatives of the bridegroom. The seamstress then rolled the pieces of material together, and left to sew them in her own home.

585 302 515 The day before the wedding in my interpreter's home at Sulaimani a woman arrived in order to remove all superfluous hair from the bride's body, whilst the bride herself removed the pubic hairs during a triple steam bath in the house's bathroom. Whereas an unmarried Kurdish girl, as with the Arabs, never shaves or removes hair from her body in other ways, she must from the time of marriage keep her body free of hair[122]. Hairs are plucked out or removed by smearing on a paste, the composition of which I was unable to discover. Dickson mentions a depilatory of this kind with the Badawi, a solution of zinc and arsenic[123] used by the well-to-do, whilst other women pluck out the hair with their fingers. Lane states that in Egypt women use a kind of resin called "Ibbin shimmar", which is smeared on in a melted state, whereas other women pluck the hairs out "after merely rubbing the part with ashes of charcoal"[124]. At another place Lane[125] refers to a depilatory, "noorah", composed of quicklime mixed with about one eight part of orpiment. This powder is stirred in water to a paste that is smeared on, loosening the hairs in two minutes, after which it is washed off.

[305] This removal of hair in my interpreter's family thus took place in the home with the help of an expert, and not, as reported by Granqvist about the Palestinian Arabs, in the public bath[126]. It was said that the bridegroom went through a similar process[127].

585 291 197 In the bride's home this form of beauty treatment in connexion with the marriage was of great interest to all the women there. This went so far that an aunt of the bride grasped her by the legs as she sat tailor-fashion in the courtyard, and attempted to overturn her in order to satisfy herself that the pubic hairs had been duly removed. It was possible to determine this as the bride that evening was not wearing Kurdish women's costume with wide baggy trousers, but a long, plain nightgown with puffed sleeves—a European phenomenon adopted into the Kurdish dress scheme, worn with a little jacket but without long trousers. Apart from this episode, which must be considered an indication of the extent to which a wedding, down to the last detail, is a family and not a private affair, Kurds

834

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

were exceedingly modest. Modesty, on the other hand, was of a type different from what we are accustomed to in our pattern of behaviour.

They felt dislike at displaying the naked body. All changing of clothes during the day among women took place in a squatting position without the body at any time being uncovered. An elsewhere European summer dress in which the daughter of the Sheikh of Topzawa had wanted to be photographed caused her to break off the sitting and to dash into the dark cookhouse in the courtyard, where she sat hunched up in the corner with her naked arms slung protectively around her bare legs, when two peasant women from the village, fetching water, happened to pass the gate to the courtyard. In the urban milieu, when my interpreter and I took a steam bath together in the bathroom, she always kept her hand covering her lap when the sitting position on the small wooden stools whilst being dowsed was not sufficiently concealing.

On the other hand shyness did not apply when relieving nature. This took place collectively and in the presence of other women fetching water from the basin, where water was available for the subsequent washing, whether in the garden basin of the sheikh's houses at Topzawa and Serkan, at the more private well-like shaft in the courtyard of the Sheikh's house at Sargalu, or at one of the big public washing basins for women in the villages. This was done discretely sheltered by the ampleness of women's costumes, but was not a private but a joint undertaking, in which solitude and peace was neither sought nor expected.

The wedding. Lane[128] says that Arabs have a special preference for Mondays and Fridays for the celebration of weddings—that is to say the day on which the bride is handed over to the bridegroom—whereas, according to Hangi[129], the Turk-stamped Bosnian Muslims favour Sundays and Thursdays.

To judge by the four wedding feasts I had an opportunity of witnessing, wholly or in part, in Southern Kurdistan, the Kurds appear to follow the Turks in this matter. In the villages the two weddings took place on Sundays (16 June and 14 July, 1957), the third on a Wednesday (22 May, 1957), whilst the one wedding I was present at at Sulaimani was celebrated on a Thursday (8 August, 1957). Later my interpreter informed me by letter of her brother's wedding, which took place on a Monday (25 August, 1958). No rule can be discerned from such sparse material, merely the negative one that the Arab predilection for Friday—the most important day of the week for Islam—as the day for the handing over of the bride does not apply in the case of the Kurds. The weddings I witnessed in Topzawa and its neighbouring village, Rakawa, took place in a humble village milieu. The upper class village milieu wedding was not celebrated during my stay in Southern Kurdistan.

At two of the three village weddings I was able to observe the men's role in the festivities, at the third the women's. In all three cases, however, I was in the bridegroom's home to which the bride was brought. In none of the cases did I have an opportunity to see what went on in the bride's home.

The fetching of the brides, *bāk*, who all came from outside, was a matter for the men[130]. At 6 in the morning a cortège of hired cars filled with men left the village for the bride's residence. Among the men, most of those in the village, was the bridegroom's father, but not the bridegroom, *zāwā*.

that the husband will have the future mastery in the home[33], an explanation I did not hear given for the blow suffered by the Kurdish bride, and one I am personally reluctant to accept. Both in regard to the symbolic sacrifice of the fowl and the blow given by the groom to the bride, we have a feature of pre-Islamic culture. As Nikitine points out, the Kurds possess a culture layer older than Islam, which becomes evident at the most important events in life: birth, marriage and burial[34].

In urban circles in Sulaimani I had an opportunity to follow the bride's last day in her old home before she was handed over to the bridegroom in the afternoon, a wedding viewed from the opposite angle to that last described. Even though, as opposed to the weddings I witnessed in the villages, this took place in an educated milieu, it will be possible to point both to resemblances and divergencies in the course of the wedding that can have a common value across the borders dividing the several environments.

At this wedding the family's own men, that is to say the bride's male relatives, left the home early in the morning and did not reappear until late in the evening. It was said that they spent the day in company with the bridegroom in a small two-roomed town house that had been rented and furnished for the young couple, as the bridegroom's family home lay far from Sulaimani, and the two people most concerned, who both belonged to the educated milieu, wanted some months later to seek positions as school teachers in one of the villages where it was apparently intended to begin educating girls also. The effects acquired with the bride price were brought to the future home of the couple some days before the wedding. The day before the wedding this house was put in order by the women of the bride's family, assisted by girl friends. The bride had not been present when the house was taken, only the bride's sister and the bridegroom. It was to act as a substitute for his family home, the place where the bride was to be received and the marriage consummated. The similarity was further increased by the fact that it was in the courtyard and loggia of this quite small house that the groom's visiting female relatives lodged. However, the picture was spoiled to some extent because the arrangement of the two rooms and loggia was done under the firm direction of the bride's sister to such an extent that she locked the three arranged rooms: the bed-room, the guest reception room and the small windowless store room, in order to stop the children brought by the bridegroom's family, who were all over the place, from upsetting the arrangement. Still her behaviour looked rather like a demonstration of the superiority of the urban cultural milieu over that of the visiting village aristocracy. As many of the ladies of Sulaimani as the bride's house and courtyard could accomodate were invited to be present on the day of the wedding to greet the bride, keep her company during the day, and in hired cars to accompany her on her drive round the town, a tour that marked the conclusion of the festivities and ended at the house of the young pair by the handing over of the bride to the bridegroom. Clad in Kurdish costume, the bride sat in state in the courtyard of her old home from the early morning and received visitors, who were offered tea, cakes and *ḥirbā*, unfermented grape juice. Everything the home possessed in the way of furniture and mattresses was placed in the courtyard and the house was filled with women and children. At about 3 p.m. the bride retired to the house's guest reception room with her sister and some of the other women. That day the whole house was occupied by the women. Here the bride completely changed her clothes, becoming a European "white bride", the

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MAII Kurd MAII

Kurdish ornaments being replaced by imitation jewellery. With the bridal gown of white satin embroidered with sequins went a short, white bridal veil, diadem and bride's bouquet of white paper flowers. Thus bedecked she was placed in a clumsy wooden chair in the middle of the courtyard to be gazed at. The cars should have come at 5 p.m., but were delayed, which was felt as a great disgrace for the whole family. At last the narrow alley outside the house was filled with big cars. The one in which the bride was to be was decorated with a red velvet silk cloth on the radiator and silk bands of the same colour tied all round the body so that it looked like a chocolate box. As in the villages, red or reddish-yellow was considered auspicious.

The bride's mother then glided out of the picture and the bride started on her round accompanied by the family's midwife who was to return with the bridal sheet with the proof of the bride's virginity, which was expected before 10 p.m. that evening. All female guests present got into the other cars to follow the bride.

As opposed to the village weddings, where the bride was fetched from her home in the morning by men in cars paid by the bridegroom's family, in the educated milieu she was driven at 5.30 p.m. to the bridal house in a car escorted by women. All the cars were ordered and paid for by the bride's family. During the day the men had been in company with the bridegroom, leaving the house on the arrival of the bride. The women of the bride's home remained at the bridal house. Their presence in the courtyard and the loggia just outside the windows of the bridal chamber, caused the bridal couple to abandon it and to withdraw to the little store room on a bed made on the floor from the extra mattresses intended for sitting on in the loggia and for sleeping out on the roof.

In connection with the urban milieu wedding, a dinner was given a week later in the bride's parental home for the men of the two families, the bride's father being the host. The women of the house naturally cooked the food, but delivered it to the door of the guest room without entering. As soon as the eating was over the men left the house. The party went on as detached from the women as was technically possible in this urban home. On the same day the newly-married wife paid her first visit to her old home since the wedding, to take a bath and to receive a gift in the form of coins to hang on her necklace, in this case amounting to 42 DM—a kind of reward for having done her family honour. During her stay in her family home she wore a veil over her head in her father's presence. She was "shy", declared her sister. This was, then, a suggestion of an avoidance phenomenon in relation to the father on the part of the newly-married daughter.

The importance of virginity. As maintained by several quarters[133], the decisive feature about what, failing a better term, we call the 'wedding', that is to say the consummation of the marriage, is with the Turks, Arabs and Orientals in general the signs of virginity. "If she is not a virgin we must kill her", was my interpreter's laconic answer to my question about her sister, whom I saw sitting in the courtyard in a white European wedding dress. She thus ran the same risk as brides I had seen in the villages, who would be killed if the accompanying woman did not return home the visible proofs of the bride's virginity. In answer to my question as to who in given circumstances would carry out the sentence I was told: the brother, the father, the cousin. However, my interpreter added that before

G. Hansen E-5 (1997) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

the door to the loggia he greeted her by reaching out the hand in question, which she kissed, laid it against her brow and passed it along both her cheeks. The name of the hand was not given me but it should be a reproduction of a "holy hand" in Baghdad.

Soothsaying. In addition to the production of amulets, traded for flour and sugar, the two sayyids had yet another thing for sale: their skill in soothsaying. Actually, this was the reason why they were allowed to carry among the women of Sheikh Taiffe's house in Topzawa. When the two parties had come to terms, a greasy book, kept in a plastic case of the sacred green colour hanging from the waistband of the one, was taken out and opened. One of the women placed her hand on it and pointed to one of the pages. The younger of the two sayyids then gave his interpretation in a droning voice.

Fortune-telling of this kind with the Kurds is referred to by Nikitine[49], who says: "Les Kurdes aiment beaucoup dire la bonne aventure ("dèrî"), et pour cela ils se servent d'un livre spécial en persane ... on l'ouvre à l'aveuglette, on regarde la sentence qui s'y trouve la première et on consulte l'indicateur que porte en haut chaque page ("bien" ou "mal") ...". A "prophecy" book of this type has been brought back from Afghanistan (E. 1275). In addition to this soothsaying with the help of a book opened at hazard, I also observed another form of fortune-telling. During my stay with the Sheikh at Sargalu, the house was visited by another wandering sayyid. Sitting on the floor, surrounded by women, he read their future by palmistry.

Visit to saints' graves. Kurdish women could visit saints' graves[50]. We visited a saint's grave outside Halabja. The saint's last resting place was in a small chapel where a grating cut off the grave itself and the carpet-hung superstructure from visitors. A basin with a spring, lying behind a wall outside the enclosure surrounding the chapel, allowed women to perform the ritual ablution necessary. One of the women that day was hindered on account of her menses (cf. p. 153) from entering the chapel and small plantation, which possessed a rag tree. Close to the saint's grave the women picked up small stones from the ground and attempted to make them stick to the wall at the side of the grating. It was said that if the stone remained sticking the wish one had would be granted, otherwise not.

Saints' graves were found in a part of a mosque in the mountain town of Tawella near to the Iranian frontier. The mosque there, described as a *tekuge*[51], was apparently a Sufi religious house[52]. The superstructures over the saints' graves inside were like houses and were hung with silken rugs[53]. On the one was the turban of the deceased. A young girl kissed the turban[54] respectfully, and scraped some soil scraped together and handed her[55] by the *mulla* who accompanied us. Over that part of the building, the architecture of which evinced considerable Persian influence in the horseshoe arches, the saints' graves were housed under vaulted domes, each of which was surmounted by a hand with outstretched fingers.

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

turban, that it covered head, neck, and face, though the features could be discerned through it. On this occasion it replaced the white or coloured head veil. Nikitine refers to the use of this reddish-yellow veil over the head of a Kurdish bride, remarking about the colour: "Le visage de la female est couvert avec une mouchoir rouge pour que .... les jours de sa vie familiale qui commencera soient rouges (c'est-à-dire heureux)"[4]. Although this yellow-saffron veil covers the face, as is also the case with the black face veil (which will be dealt with later), it must not be viewed in conjunction with it. It is a Kurdish variant of the bridal veiling, referred to in respect of Egyptian Arabs by Lane in the middle of the previous century, where, during the procession to the house, the bride, sitting under a rose or yellow-coloured canopy, is covered by a red Cashmere shawl[5], thus clothed quite differently from the accompanying women in their black, silk coverings and white face veils that reach up to, but do not cover, the eyes.

A similar bridal covering is mentioned by Granqvist in the case of Palestinian Arabs[6]. This veil is described as a thick woollen cloth, similar to the ordinary sack, thrown over the bride's head, hiding the face, whilst a caftan hides the rest of the figure. I had no opportunity of discovering whether the saffron-coloured veil was used in the other feminine milieus.

The white European bridal veil. The existence of the short, transparent red-white "bridal" veil, used in the humble village milieu, explains perhaps why the short white Western bridal veil could be adopted into the Kurdish dress scheme. When I saw the white bridal veil in use within the mixed educated and uneducated urban milieu (in Sulaimani), all the other women in the escorting cars were closely veiled in black. The difference between the white bride and the other women corresponds to the difference described by Lane between the Egyptian Arab bride and the women in her train[7].

The white bridal veil lacks the red colour of happiness, but the fact that the bride's car is decorated with ribbons of rose silk tied across it and a rose silk cover is sufficient to atone for this deficiency. The Kurdish white bride stood out from the rest of Kurdish female dress. However, this is perhaps less a breach of tradition than it appears at first sight, for, apart from the colour the white bridal veil seen in Sulaimani, although it seems incompatible with the close veiling otherwise practised in town, gives the bride an appearance which seems in accord with the village tradition.

The black face veil has been taken over from the Turks. It is the Turkish-Kurdish variant of the women's veil that has been, and in many places still is, worn outside the home in Islamic areas from Morocco in the west to Afghanistan in the east, from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the north to Aden in the south. In Kurdistan the veil is never worn without an uppermost over-garment, the *Arabi abā* worn as a cowl. I mention this because in Russia in 1938 the same Turkish face veil was seen worn alone with a European coat and skirt. In Baghdad, on the other hand the *abā*-garment was worn, but not the veil. By the irony of fate the veil—originally the sign of an honest woman as opposed to a harlot—is now reserved to prostitutes, who are recognized by it[8].

Sura 24, verses 30-31[9] of the Coran are usually considered to form the religious basis for the

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Sura 24, verses 30-31

of the Coran are usually considered to form the religious basis for the complete veiling practised by Muslim women, supplemented by the recommendation, contained in Sura 33, verse 59, that the wives and daughters of the Faithful put on an over-garment when leaving the house in order that they shall be recognized as honest women. Sura 24, verses 30-31 runs: ("Say to the believing men that they cast down their looks and guard their private parts; that is purer for them; surely *Allah* is aware of what they do). And say to the believing women that they cast down their looks and guard their private parts and not display their ornaments except what appears thereof, and let them wear their headcoverings over their bosoms, and not display their ornaments except to their husbands, or their fathers, or the fathers of their husbands, or their sons, or the sons of their husbands, or their brothers, or their brothers' sons, or their sisters' sons, or their women, or those whom their right hands possess, or the male servants not having need (*of women*), or the children who have not attained knowledge of what is hidden of women; and let them not strike their feet so that what they hide of their ornaments may be known; and turn to *Allah* all of you, O believers! so that you may be successful"[4].

It is maintained that the veiling of women was originally foreign to the Arabs and the prophet Mohammed[5], having been adopted by Islam after the prophet's death in 632 during the years of expansion in Syria and Mesopotamia. Here contact was made with the Hellenic-Byzantine empire where women led a secluded life, a custom preserved from ancient Greece. The veil was adopted as a mark of respectability as opposed to harlotry, and veiling was further extended, justifying this by reference to the two mentioned Suras of the Coran. By obtaining religious backing the veil and shawl or scarf, though varying somewhat in the different Islamic areas, became something quite different from any other clothing. It became a symbol of a religious idea and of a definite pattern of behaviour. By its anonymity, it gave women a liberty that no other dress could provide. It aroused a respect that can only be compared with that shown to a man's habit. Unknown and unrecognizable, she in that dress represented something inviolate and protected. No man could demand to see the face hidden by the veil. Unseen, she was not only herself but also represented half the community, and in virtue of this she could demand consideration and the maintenance of certain privileges. She herself was able to see the one to whom she was speaking, but the reverse was not the case. Woodward[6] quotes various statements made by women who had been accustomed to wear, or still wore, the veil. An Islamic woman from Alexandria says: "A veil .... presents strange paradoxes. It is a restrictive emphasis on sex relationship, and also on moral promotion; a sign of utter dependence and also of freedom from responsibility; a handicap to real progress and a symbol of special privilege. In a word the veil represents an entirely different social system. Discarding it, therefore, involves a whole change of psychology impossible for a Western woman to understand .... an entirely foreign to you and so much a part of us ....".

Over-garment and veil were in use in all four feminine environments in Southern Kurdistan, but to very different extents. The women of the village aristocracy did not wear them in daily life, but only when visiting a town (see p. 70). They then wore them from the moment of leaving home until they returned. For the women it was thus a sign that they were leaving a village milieu to enter an urban environment. The same applied to women of the humble village milieu."Many times in the city at feasts I have been addressed by closely-veiled women, who, when they raised the veil, proved to

4: Human E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

With the introduction of monogamous marriage and divorce that not only gets rid of the wife, but also disorders the children's home, a phenomenon hitherto unknown will arise in Kurdistan and other Islamic areas that are copying our pattern of culture, the solitary mother: on the one hand the solitary divorced mother, and on the other, the result of women's entry into the labour market, the solitary unmarried mother.

Although it has been maintained from several quarters[1] that the veil and seclusion, women's withdrawn social position, were originally foreign to the Arabs and to Muhammad, and were first adopted by Islam when the Arabs came into contact with the Greek-Hellenic, Byzantine culture, the fact remains that this retired status obtained religious sanction from Sura 24, verse 31 of the Coran. Consequently, the veil and seclusion are as much a religious as a secular matter. The law of Islam *Sari'a*, goes far deeper than does Roman law. The ordinances of the Coran, the whole *fiqh* system, comprises every detail of existence, and constitutes a practical guide, a pattern of behaviour[2]. The restrictions resulting therefrom were maintained by Kurdish women in Iraq with the greatest seriousness, respect and care in all four feminine milieus.

In general, attention has been paid to the fact that women in Muslim homes where seclusion was maintained to a greater or lesser degree, were confined to certain parts of the house. There is therefore reason to point out that the man may equally well be said to be excluded from the women's apartments of all the other homes he may visit. In Kurdish villages only the guest room, a part of the squire's house, was open to him. In towns he was permitted to enter the guest room (without a glance at the courtyard) and to leave the house again just as discreetly. The core of the home was the forbidden area; the women there were the people he was not allowed to see. From the time a boy passed a certain age, a wall was suddenly raised between him and the women's world; he was shut out and reduced to the society of other men and the streets. The women belonging to his own home formed an exception.

The banks, post offices and public offices I visited were as gloomy and cheerless as barracks. A chair at a street corner or a tea house bench was the womanless world to which a male was relegated on reaching manhood. It seemed to me that the men in their male world did not thrive as much as did the women and children in their half of society. Somehow or other the women seemed to have discovered a more lively and friendly social convivialist between themselves than had the men, or, for that matter, than we have in the West. Under cover of the veil women were able to move about in the men's world. Outside the home their world was not devoid of men to the same extent that the men's world was devoid of women. Even though women were veiled in the street they were able to see. In many cases they were also able to talk, trade and bargain with men in the *sûq*, in banks and in post offices. They could see whom they were addressing; men saw only a black veil.

In view of the great part that conformance with the rules of Islam played in the life of Kurdish women, her positive attitude to the five pillars of Islam (see chapter V), any change in her life pattern in this quarter would involve a complete transformation. It is not surprising that the altered life of women in Turkey has led to personal bond in hand with a sustained offensive on all things Arab and

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

INTRODUCTION

621
[36] Scattered over the South Kurdish countryside are a great number of small, compact villages, essentially similar in their physical aspects, yet highly variegated with respect to their composition and organization, ranging from extended lineage organizations to fully developed feudal organization. Thus, on the village level, there is a great diversity of forms of social organization. Yet the *culture* of the area seems essentially uniform, and these alternative principles of organization are universally known. In the recent history of some villages, there has been a rapid, fundamental change from one type of social organization to another. In the following, an attempt will be made to discuss these various types of organization as they express themselves in the actual power hierarchy of individuals in the village. The discussion will thus be directed towards discovering what types of social categories exist, what actual powers each category entails, and which of these categories are found in harmoneous conjunction — since some of the categories that belong in different basic frameworks of social organization are, as might be expected, mutually exclusive in any local community.

177 It seems probable that a fluid and complex situation of this type is characteristic of societies which lie in the shatter zone between larger culture areas — in this case, between the Arab, Persian, and Turkish. Such a location produces familiarity with various competing normative systems, principles of organization, and power hierarchies. This familiarity on the part of the villager leads to attempts at

manipulating these various systems and principles. Thus competing factions, manipulating the familiar (but in part mutually exclusive) systems, will establish different power hierarchies in different villages, resulting in the present variety of forms of social organization found in the area.

However, one type of basic organization may be said to be autonomously Kurdish. This is usually called *tribal*, and is based on the *lineage principle*. Any movement away from this basic framework of organization will be the result of the above type of manipulations, and may be seen as a step in a «de-tribalization process». A special attempt will be made to explore the structure of the tribal group, and its reactions to the pressures that tend to lead to its breakdown.

Certain characteristics of the lineage system in its Kurdish application might profitably be stated immediately, to avoid confusion. The Kurds practice close family endogamy with preferential FaBrDa marriage, and a Kurdish descent group shows many consequent characteristics, among which is a tendency towards constant branching and the establishment of new, independent endogamous subsections. The concept of a lineage, as developed for other areas, normally applies to an *exo*gamous grouping. However, the main importance of the lineage concept is in the field of political organization, and it will be seen that the political functions of the Kurdish descent groups and the African lineage groups are essentially similar. This might be expected, if only from the following consideration: Women in Kurdish society are normally of minimal political importance, and matrilineal descent has no political significance. The strictly *patri*lineal descent group will be unmodified by any patterns of preferential marriage. Since this, in Kurdish society, is the politically significant group, the fact of endogamy has no direct political importance. I have therefore chosen to call this patrilineal descent group a *lineage* when politically recognized.

After an orientation on some factors which are uniform over the whole South Kurdish area, notably in the field of subsistence and kinship, the formal lineage organization will be discussed, as well as the basic pattern of non-tribal formal organization; and the fundamental composition of the resulting local groups will be treated.

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

stable, and official administration, directed from Baghdad, grew in scope and progessively enlarged its area of effective control.

Such then is the background of the villages where the following material was collected. They are primarily tenant villages in the Suleimani valley, or villages dominated by freeholding Hamawand farmers. However, certain aspects of local social structure become clear only by comparison with other situations — particularly those found in the *Jaf* areas — or by historical comparisons and deductions. The data on Jaf organization was obtained from a limited number of informants on short visits to various villages. For historical material, C. J. Rich's accounts (op.cit) have been found most useful.

I have tried to avoid bringing conditions and factors in the towns of Suleimani, Chemchemal, Halebja, etc. into the picture. The numerous «Western» influences in these centers are extremely complicated and difficult to evaluate. In the intricacies of the class and near-caste system, differential contacts and reactions due to sub-cultures are indeed complex. The rural areas, on the other hand, show greater uniformity in patterns: the tribal areas are organized and separable, and the tenant villagers, in their small, endogamous communities, have strong patterns of localism and traditionalism. There is a popular story illustrating this localism: A donkey belonging to one of the tenant farmers in a village ran away; so the farmer followed it, to catch it. The donkey climbed up the hillside, far away from the village, but the farmer did not want to lose it. So he followed it high up into the mountains, never turning, and finally close to the mountain top he caught it. On turning around he saw below him the whole beautiful Shahr-i-zur plain, in which his own village lay. The peasant gasped and exclaimed: «I never knew the world was so vast!»

What goes on in the towns belongs, as far as most villagers are concerned, to a quite separate world, and it seemed both in the field and in working up the notes valid to separate off the Kurdish *countryside* as the area of study. But due to diversity even in this area, any attempt at giving a conventional anthropological description of «the culture» of «the society» must fail. Each of the compact, widely separated little villages shows characteristics of its own, local

8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
Rowanduz

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of modern methods of agriculture. The villages as will be seen from Map 2 are situated mostly in the valleys. East of Dergala village practically the whole area is snow bound throughout the winter. Before the war, though the area was nominally under Turkish domination, the local Kurdish leaders maintained practical independence. After the war the area came within the area of the Iraq mandate. The policy adopted by the British administration and the immediate political consequences are described by Hay. Crudely summarised it may be said that after some initial mistakes in which the government unfortunately "backed the wrong man" the administration eventually achieved a relative tranquility by paying all the important leaders a substantial salary provided they behaved themselves. The economic consequences of this will be referred to later. Following the abandonment of the mandate, or perhaps earlier, it was decided by the Baghdad authorities to adopt a more positive policy of "pacification". "A strategic road was built through the mountains from Erbil to Rowanduz and continued on to the Persian border; a large military barracks was established at Rowanduz with subsidiary police posts at Rayat and Gelala. The economic and political consequences of the building of this road have been very great and will be discussed in greater detail later.

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To sum up then, the distinguishing characteristics of area A[1] are the poverty of the soil resources; the severity of the winter; the extreme difficulty, until very recently, of any intercommunication between the various valleys; and the fact that such "tribal disintegration" as is now found is all of fairly recent origin dating for the most part from the construction of the road and the establishment of permanent police authority in the Rayat valley.

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B. Foothill Area. This area corresponding approximately to the administrative district of Shaqlawa is separated from area A by an almost impassable range of mountains. On the South side on the other hand it merges quite gradually into the plains area C. Geographical considerations therefore are mainly responsible for the fact that the inhabitants of area B, though presumably of identical cultural origins to those of area A, have for many years been in much closer contact with the Arab world and western "sophisticated" influences generally. At the present time the tribes of this area no longer function as political entities, and the whole region is in a very real sense "directly administered" by the police. Hay's account (1920) makes it appear that conditions were very similar even in his time though the process of disintegration has doubtless been intensified in the interval. The potential economic resources of the district are probably much greater than for area A both on account of the milder climate and the greater area of cultivable land.

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* An account of the construction of this road is given by A.M.Hamilton - Road through Kurdistan.

1 [Rowanduz -- Analyst]

8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
Rowanduz

Apart from these two non-tribal villages, all the groups in the Balik and Dergala areas are at least 95% pure Kurdish. The intrusive element is provided by a few Jews and Assyrian Christians who as a rule carry on some special trade such as weaving or carpentry and are thus tolerated as useful members of the community. 563 463

Method of Analysis.

As is clear from what has already been said, the tribal organisation of the various groups throughout the area under review have all to a greater or less degree been effected by contact with, and interference by the external administrative authority. If we go so far as to assume that at one time there was a form of social organisation which could be regarded as the typical norm for all the hill tribes of this region, it is certain that such a norm can nowhere now be found functioning in its complete state. Kurdish society as it exists today is a society undergoing extremely rapid and at times violent social change. As we shall see there are powerful and perhaps irresistable forces at work tending not so much to the modification as to the total destruction and disintegration of existing forms of tribal organisation. In such circumstances, in order to make the description intelligible at all, some degree of idealisation seems essential. In the main therefore I shall seek to describe Kurdish society as if it were a functioning whole and then show up existing circumstances as variations from this idealised norm. I am aware that such a method makes the resulting description to some extent subjective and that on many points I have not the empirical data to check the validity of my hypothetical norm. In the circumstances however it appears to be the most reasonable procedure to adopt. 177 • 121

The External Administration

The precise form of the external administration has no very direct bearing on the Kurdish social system as described in this monograph. But at various points in the argument especially in the section dealing with economic problems reference will have to be made to elements in the administrative organisation, and it seems desirable therefore to give first a brief description of the functions and relationships of the various members of this external organisation. 177 635

The administrative system of Iraq has been developed out of that of the old Ottoman Empire. The terminology remains in many respects unaltered. The whole of the Kurdish area here under

8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
Rowanduz

622 landlord of the soil - by which title he receives rent, and he supports the village Guest House. As we shall see later these two functions are closely interrelated.

000 Social Organisation Areas other than Balik

As explained earlier my information for groups other than the Balik must be treated with reserve. The following notes may however prove of value to further students of the area.

621 Area B. It would appear that the tribes of this area such as
• 177 the Surchi and the Khushnao were originally organised on much the same lines as described above but that owing to their relatively long period of contact with an external administration the social forms have now become blurred. The general tendency seems to be for the land to become the property of absentee landlords having no kinship relation with their tenants. The villages moreover lack the clan homogeneity noticeable among the Balik.

621 Area C. Mention has already been made of the principle settled tribes of this area, the Dizai and the Girdi. With the Dizai as recorded by Hay the organisation is feudal rather than tribal, since the village Aghas are not of the same kin group as their tenants. I was told that "all the Dizai call each other amosa" implying, if true, that the whole tribe consists of one taifa only. With the Girdi the position appears to be somewhat different. Jemil Agha, their paramount chief, is himself a Girdi but is a townsman in habit and holds himself very much aloof from his followers.

361 In its technological aspects the plains culture differs
312 markedly from that of the hills, especially as regards housebuilding and agricultural equipment. An important sociological difference is that, owing to the limited water supply, the position of the village sites is determined and limited by the occurrence of water holes, and the villages in consequence are larger than those found in the hills. From the size of the surrounding cemetery and from archaeological considerations it would appear that some such sites (Bahrika for instance) have been in continuous occupation for several thousand years.

The Nomads

621 Though my information is extremely scanty the indications are that the social organisation of tribes such as the Herki differs in many respects from that of the settled tribes. In terminology the term kabila appears to correspond to ashiret and khel to taifa but the identity may not be exact. The term hoba corresponds to gund and implies a small settlement of tents in one location. This last term is also used by the settled peoples. Thus among the Shevdini

of thirty persons I reached the conclusion that it was made up as follows:-

1	The Agha himself	
1	Wife	
3	Sons	
4	Daughters	
7	Maidservants	Mostly kinsfolk of some sort
4	Menservants	
1	Mulla	
1	Brother	
5	Guests	
3	By exaggeration	
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In fact it became quite clear that he lumped together all household expenditure as "the expense of the Guest House", though in fact his expenditure on the guests represented only a small fraction of the total.

Moreover the really expensive item in Guest House upkeep is not the killing of a kid a day, but the cost of sugar, tea and coffee: especially sugar. During the last fifty years or so the Russian style of tea drinking has become fashionable throughout Kurdistan. The tea is brewed very strong over samovars and served with enormous quantities of lump sugar. The samovar is brought into operation as soon as the guest arrives and tea is served at persistent intervals until he goes away again. Owing to the high import duties and costs of transport, sugar costs about 45/- a bag (of 36 Kilos); and I was told that a bag would last a Guest House such as that of Dergala about a month provided there were no special occasions such as weddings and funerals to be allowed for. If this figure is anywhere near accurate it implies an expenditure of some £27 per annum on sugar alone, which, considering the limited facilities available for obtaining ready cash, is a very substantial sum indeed. Actually the situation must be radically effected by the fact that, as noted above, the guest gives presents to his host. As might be expected the gifts that are most acceptable and mostly frequently given are the luxury imports already mentioned - sugar, tea and coffee. I cannot then be certain whether, prestige considerations apart, it is an economic advantage or disadvantage for an Agha to have a large number of guests. Even funerals which involve a long period of polite 'social calls' continuing for over a month, and which certainly involve the Agha in heavy outgoings of rice and meat, may yet, it would appear, prove to be profitable in the long run.

On the other hand whatever may be the immediate relationship, between the Guest House and the Aghas net income, the importance of Guest House expenditure in the economics of the group as a whole must

8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
Rowanduz

CHAPTER 5

Warfare

Under present conditions large scale warlike activities on the part of the tribes are a complete impossibility, but that does not justify us in dismissing the topic of warfare altogether as being of no relevance to the present social situation. Historically speaking the traditional forms of Kurdish social organisation are associated with an ideology of raids and counter raids, war, pillage and feud. Earlier writers have undoubtedly greatly exaggerated the extent to which the average Kurd in former times did in fact devote himself to murder, violence and loot, but in describing this preoccupation they were, after all, only accepting the Kurd at his own valuation. The Kurdish ideal of manly behaviour does correspond very closely with the typical English concept of a "Brigand". His folk tales are gory in the extreme; his conversation hardly less so. And this has relevance to the existing situation. The Agha likes to think of himself as a military leader rather than as a landlord; he habitually classes all his neighbours into 'friends' and 'enemies'. The consequences of this attitude are highly subtle and cannot be examined here, but at least two divergent trends can be noted. On the one hand the sharp antagonism between neighbouring groups is even today a force of social cohesion; the members of the clan or the tribe are aware of their unity largely in terms of their common enmity to some other group. On the other hand increasing economic contacts and the constant harmonising efforts of the Police and the Administration, in so far as they are successful in lessening intergroup suspicion, do at the same time serve to lessen the social cohesion of the groups concerned.

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While organised raiding or warfare is now impossible the private feud continues and may be examined further.

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The Feud

The motif of the blood feud may be summarised by the phrase that "a man's wrongs must be avenged by his kinsfolk and his descendants", and we may note at once that a system of small patrilocal, nearly endogamous groups is peculiarly suited to perpetuate antagonisms of this kind. The individual's near kinfolk are also his near neighbours, and since his wife's kinsfolk are probably identical with his own he is bound by no ties of loyalty to any group outside his own village. Within the village all are bound together to resist the aggressor, beyond it everyone is a potential enemy, the identity of interest between the family and the village is complete.

Quarrels between villages may arise from a variety of causes, chiefly economic. Water and grazing rights are always ill-defined and may lead to serious friction in times of scarcity, and this may

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8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
Rowanduz

The Positive Contribution

121 183 On the other hand on the positive side I have attempted to avoid dry generalisations of the form "the Kurds marry their first cousins". My aim definitely has not been to record the "manners and customs" of the Kurds. Rather I have tried to throw some light on the contrasting factors of conflict and cohesion that affect the lives of the small group of people inhabiting this Rowandus area. If there is any moral in the story it is to emphasise once again the futility of attaching psychological labels to cultural groups. Again and again the Kurds as a group have been labelled treacherous, bloodthirsty, lazy, virile, stupid and a dozen things besides; this study at least should show that there can be no such easy classification. It is true that the structural pattern of a society does impose upon individuals some standardisation of behaviour, but this structural pattern affects the interests of different individuals in widely different ways and their resulting reactions differ accordingly. There can never be absolute conformity to the cultural norm, indeed the norm itself exists only as a stress of conflicting interests and divergent attitudes. All cultural groups, no matter how stable they appear in the light of history, are within themselves at any given time in a constant state of flux and potential change, the balance is always precarious.

• 177 121 Thus the changes, often violent and disintegrative, that arise under conditions of Culture Contact differ only in degree and not in kind from smaller incipient changes that take place all the time even when the culture group is functioning under "natural" conditions, however those may be defined. The mechanism of culture change is to be found in the reaction of individuals to their differential economic and political interests. Viewed in this light the problems even of a small and obscure Kurdish tribe may have a wide and general relevance, extending even to the conditions of our own society. The study of processes of change and development is a cardinal problem for sociologists. As an anthropologist I would argue that these processes can best be studied in the microcosmic conditions of a small and relatively isolated group, where the limits of individual interest can be clearly recognised; but the problem is one of general application.

In conclusion, so far as the Kurds are concerned, I will merely express the hope that this analysis is soon put out of date by more intensive research.

9: Roosevelt G-5 (1946-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
Mahabad

FORMATION OF THE KOMALA

186 609 668 It was in this town of Mahabad, left to its own devices by the Allies, that the most recent of the Kurdish nationalist movements was born. On August 16, 1943, a dozen young Kurds, most of them small merchants and petty officials of the town, founded the Komala-i-Zhian-i-Kurd, or "Committee of Kurdish Youth." For purposes of secrecy, the membership of the new party was kept below 100 and was organized in cells; the semi-weekly meetings were never held in the same house twice in succession. The Constitution of the Komala was strongly nationalist and membership was restricted to persons of Kurdish descent on both sides of the family, the only exception being for those with an Assyrian mother — an indication of the present close relations between Kurds and Assyrians.

The Komala spread rapidly, not only in Iran but in other countries as well, where Kurds saw in the new group a more vigorous force than in the traditional Kurdish nationalist parties. Chapters of the Komala were founded in the Iraqi towns of Mosul, Kirkuk, Erbil, Suleimania, Rowanduz, and Shaklawa; and there was a chapter functioning even in Turkey, where Kurdish nationalist activity is an offense punishable by death. The chiefs of the tribes in the vicinity of Mahabad also sent emissaries offering help. They were told that they were not needed then, but might be called on in the future.

• 177 668 It was inevitable that the two great powers primarily interested in the area should eventually hear of the Komala. The British, whose Kirkuk oil fields are located in Kurdish country, kept a watchful eye on developments. Their political adviser in Mosul sometimes ranged as far as Mahabad, while his subordinates were stationed in Rowanduz, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Suleimania. Yet the British could not encourage Kurdish aspirations without arousing Arab resentment, and so remained deaf to the overtures of the Kurdish nationalists.

SOVIET INFILTRATION

With the Soviets it was a different story. At first they were evidently unprepared for active work among the Kurds, although

9: Roosevelt G-5 (1946-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
Mahabad

• 177 668 they did once, in 1942, invite the leading aghas to Baku. In the spring of that year, when the Kurds raided some villages west of Lake Urmieh, the Soviets even brought back the Iranian army and gendarmerie (though they rendered their possible services ineffective by constant interference). Yet the Soviets eventually realized the potentialities of the situation. The year 1944 saw Azerbaijan and Kurdistan filled with Soviet political officers and other agents, mostly Moslems from Soviet Azerbaijan. The work in Kurdistan centered around the Soviet Consulate in Rezaieh, attached to which was at least one of the Soviet Union's 100,000 Kurds, known as "Captain Jafarov," who wandered freely among the tribesmen and villagers in Kurdish dress.

Soviet activity in Mahabad dates from the time two of these agents, known as "Abdullahov" and "Hajiov," appeared, ostensibly to buy horses for the Red Army. Apparently a chance encounter first brought them into contact with the Kurdish [578] nationalist movement. The story is that Abdullahov met a man dressed in Kurdish costume in an Armenian wine-shop in Mahabad and complimented him on wearing the national dress.[1] This attention aroused the interest of the Kurd, who happened to be one of the founders of the Komala. They fell into conversation, and finally the Kurd asked whether the Soviets would furnish arms if the Kurds were to form a nationalist party. Abdullahov parried with the question, "Who are you afraid of?" The Kurd said that they feared only their own khans. Abdullahov replied with an expression of contempt for the khans; the Kurd then brought him to a private home where he introduced him to the other leaders of the Komala. Further contacts with Soviet authorities were arranged and one of the Komala leaders who knew Russian became the party's liaison officer. From that time, although the party program called for appeals to each of the Big

[1] Kurdish dress consists of a traveled turban of blue silk, embroidered vest, baggy grey pants of homespun wool, and a huge crimson kammerband, intricately knotted in front, from which protrudes a pipe, the top of a tobacco pouch, and a long, curved dagger. The Kurds, like other Iranians forced to abandon their native dress by Reza Shah, kept their clothes hidden in their homes, a symbol of their national pride, until the Allied invasion, when they suddenly blossomed out in them. Indeed, the tribesmen, safe in their mountains, had never really abandoned them. The Kurds are incorrigible dandies and a poor man among them would rather spend his last coins on a fine sash than on a good *kabab*. Reza Shah's restrictions on their dress had served to make him and his regime all the more hated.

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9: Roosevelt G-5 (1946-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
Mahabad

177 668 Three impartially, the Komala moved inevitably into the Soviet orbit.

During this period VOKS, the Soviet international propaganda organization, was starting a number of "Iranian-Soviet Cultural Relations Societies" in all sections of Iran. As the Komala had grown too big to continue meeting in private homes, its leaders now asked the Soviets to found a branch in Mahabad; they hoped thus to obtain a place to meet without attracting too much attention. The Soviets readily complied, and it was founded, not as a branch of the Iranian-Soviet Relations Society, but as the "Kurdistan-Soviet Cultural Relations Society" (Anjoman-i-Farhangi-i-Kurdistan-u-Shuravi). The clubhouse was soon crowded with Kurds, who showed their gratitude to their new patrons by sending ten cases of cigarettes made of Kurdish tobacco to the victors of Leningrad.

186 536 668 It was at a ceremony in the society's clubhouse, in April 1945, that the Komala finally came into the open. The Soviet Consul from Rezaieh and the chief of VOKS in Azerbaijan were honored guests. The main feature of the program was an "opera" in which a woman called "Daik Nishteman" (Mother Native Land) was represented as abused by three ruffians, "Iraq," "Iran," and "Turkey," finally to be rescued by her stalwart sons. The audience, unused to dramatic representations, was deeply moved, and blood-feuds generations old were composed as life-long enemies fell weeping on each other's shoulders and swore to avenge Kurdistan.

177 622 668 At this ceremony the future head of the Kurdish state, Qazi Mohammad, was finally admitted to the party, to the gratification of the Soviets, who had not liked the democratic organization of the Komala and had long been looking for someone on whom they could count to lead it according to their suggestions. At first the Soviets, realizing the strength of the tribes, had approached tribal chiefs with requests to lead the nationalist movement. But only three of them commanded sufficient prestige for the task — Qaranei Agha Rais-ol-Ashair, venerable chief of the Mamesh and the acknowledged leader of the federation of which they were a part; Amr Khan Sharifi, chief of the Shikak and "grand old man" of Kurdistan; and Amir Asad of the Dehbokri, die-hard

9: Roosevelt G-5 (1946-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
Mahabad

177 622 668

conservative who, as honorary chief of the gendarmerie, had been made responsible for security of the area by the Iranian Government. But Soviet overtures to each met only polite evasion.

Thus it was that the Soviets finally turned to Qazi Mohammad, hereditary judge and religious leader of Mahabad, and a member of its most respected family. They were frequent guests at his house and eventually helped him, through pressure on the Iranian Government, to replace Amir Asad as government representative in the area, by his brother Seif Qazi, who took over the title of Commander of the Gendarmerie. Qazi Mohammad is said to have learned of the Komala only about a year after its formation, when he sent emissaries discreetly offering his adherence. Komala leaders had decided not to admit him, fearing that because of his strong and authoritarian character and also because of the deference which they themselves had been accustomed since childhood to show him and his family, he would eventually dominate the party and end its democratic character. When at Soviet insistence the Komala finally did admit him, there came about precisely the result they feared — one-man rule of the party.

Qazi's admission enabled the Soviets to draw the Kurds rapidly into line with Soviet policy, which, by the summer of 1945, began to reflect the growing aggressiveness shown by the Soviets elsewhere. Previously the instrument of Soviet penetration in Iran had been the Tudeh Party, a popular front of Iranian left-wingers which, although successful in other parts of Iran, had never been able to take root in Kurdistan.[2] Now, however, the Soviets were considering a new and ambitious plan — the attachment of northwestern Iran to the Soviet Union. Accordingly they formed an independence party to replace the Tudeh in Azerbaijan, a party which could then without embarrassing the Tudeh in other parts of Iran stage a revolution, declare the province independent, and possibly request incorporation in the Soviet Union. Obedient to Soviet orders, the Tudeh abolished itself and re-formed as the "Democrat Party of Azerbaijan," whereupon it began to use Azerbaijani Turkish as its official language and to demand separation from Iran.

[2] For a discussion of the Tudeh Party, see George Lenczowski, "The Communist Movement in Iran," *Middle East Journal*, I (1947), pp. 29-45. [Source # 24]

9: Roosevelt G-5 (1946-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
Mahabad

177 668 The Kurds of western Azerbaijan — which includes Mahabad — could hardly have been expected to join a party purportedly dedicated to Azerbaijani Turkish nationalism, so a new party had to be formed to fit them into the Soviet scheme. On September 12, Captain Namazaliev, Soviet Town Commandant in Miandoab, summoned the chiefs of the important Kurdish tribes, together with Qazi Mohammad and Seif Qazi, to Tabriz ostensibly to see the Soviet Consul. When they arrived, the bewildered Kurds were suddenly told to proceed to the railway station, where they were hustled onto a train and taken to Baku. For three days they lived in a villa outside the town and were entertained with tours, the theater, and the opera. On the fourth day they were ushered in to see Bagherov, President of the Azerbaijan S.S.R., who harangued them regarding the wrongs they had suffered under Reza Shah, and said that the Soviet Government would help the new Democrat Party, which was dedicated to freedom for the oppressed and which he strongly urged them to join. He condemned both the Tudeh Party, which he characterized as a group of ineffective trouble-makers, and the Komala, which he said was started in Iraq under the auspices of British intelligence and was nothing but an instrument of British imperialism. Then, after a warning not to say anything about the trip, the Kurds were put on the train to Tabriz, where they were loaded into Red army vehicles and driven off to their homes.

THE DEMOCRAT PARTY OF KURDISTAN

186 668 The results of the expedition were soon apparent. Shortly after his return, Qazi Mohammad called a meeting of Kurdish notables to announce the formation of the Democrat Party of Kurdistan, which he urged all to join. Concluding from its name that the goal of the party was democracy on the American model, many responded enthusiastically. A manifesto, signed by Qazi Mohammad and 105 leading Kurds, was issued; it stated that the Kurdish people now wished "to take advantage of the liberation of the world from Fascism and to share in the promises of the Atlantic Charter." The declaration said that the Kurds wished nothing but the human and constitutional rights denied them by Reza Shah, and listed their aims as follows:

9: Roosevelt G-5 (1946-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
Mahabad

668 642 The fall of Tabriz was the cue for Qazi Mohammad to declare his own area independent — which it had long been in fact. On December 15 at a meeting in Mahabad attended by tribal chiefs, the leaders of the new Kurdish Democrat Party, Mulla Mustafa, and three Soviet officers in a jeep and armed with tommy-guns, he solemnly inaugurated the Kurdish People's Government and raised the Kurdish flag. A national parliament of thirteen members was formed, and on January 22, 1946, Qazi Mohammad was elected president of the new republic. The Minister of War was his cousin, Mohammad Hosein Khan Seif Qazi, a merchant whose military reputation rested on his honorary rank of captain in the Iranian gendarmerie. Seif Qazi, Mulla Mustafa, Amr Khan Shikak, Hama Rashid Khan Banei (just returned from Iraq with his tribesmen), and Zero Beg Herki [3] received the rank of "marshal," and were provided with Soviet uniforms, complete with high boots, stiff shoulder-straps, and red-banded garrison caps.[4]

578 668 The new government, which controlled only a minute territory including the towns of Mahabad, Bokan, Naqadeh, and Ushnuieh, sent observers to the opening of the Azerbaijan National Parliament and even convoked a miniature parliament of its own. It also dispatched Mulla Mustafa south to fight the Iranian garrisons in Saqqiz, Baneh, and Sardasht, cut off from each other and their base in Senandaj by the heavy winter snows.

RELATIONS WITH TABRIZ AND TEHRAN

Meanwhile in the north the capture of Rezaieh by the Azerbaijani Democrats brought new problems to the Kurdish government. Although the majority of the inhabitants of the plains west

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[3] Zero Beg was a bandit chief originally associated with the famous Shikak rebel chief, Simitko. Upon the latter's defeat and murder by Reza Shah, Zero Beg fled to Iraq, returning in 1941 to carve out a domain for himself in the Baranduz Valley. He was often seen with Soviet political officers and seems to have been their favored protégé. Although of little importance in his own tribe, the Herki, most of whom still followed their hereditary chiefs, these Soviet connections enabled him to play an important role in developments in Kurdistan.

[4] Other officials of the new government were Hajji Baba Sheikh, local religious leader, Prime Minister; Sadiq Haideri, Minister of Works and Propaganda; Nasaf Karimi, Minister of Education; Mohammad Amin Mu'ini, Minister of Commerce; Ahmad Ilahi, Minister of the Treasury; Seyyid Mohammad Tahazadeh, Minister of Health; and Khalil Khosrovi, Minister of the Interior. Only one of these men had been among the founders of the Komala, but all belonged to the middle or upper classes — small merchants, officials, landlords.

9: Roosevelt G-5 (1946-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
Mahabad

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of Lake Urmieh, from Rezaieh north to Maku, are Azerbaijani Turks, the tribes of the hills commanding the plains are Kurds. The Miandoab area, southeast of the lake, also has a mixed population. These areas were claimed by both the Tabriz and the Mahabad governments and were a source of constant friction. Amr Khan and the tribes paid little attention to the Azerbaijani Democrats, and were continually encroaching on the villages and towns presumably under the control of Tabriz. In April 1946, the Soviets brought Qazi Mohammad to Tabriz in an attempt to settle the differences between the Azerbaijanis and the Kurds. It was essential at that time that the two puppet states form a united front, as negotiations were about to open between the Democrats and the Iranian Government for a permanent settlement of the status of the province.

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The final result of talks between Pishevari, leader of the Azerbaijani Democrats, Qazi Mohammad, and the Soviets was a treaty signed April 23, 1946, by the Kurdish and the Azerbaijani representatives. Publication of this treaty caused consternation in Tehran, as its clauses and indeed its very existence showed that the twin Democrat regimes considered themselves independent nations with the right to exchange representatives and make treaties. The text of the treaty was as follows:

1. The two signatory governments will exchange representatives whenever it is deemed advisable.
2. In those areas of Azerbaijan where there are Kurdish minorities, Kurds will be appointed to government departments, and in those parts of Kurdistan where there are Azerbaijani minorities, Azerbaijanis will be appointed to government departments.
3. A joint economic commission will be formed to solve the economic problems of the signatory nations. Members of this commission will be appointed by the heads of the national governments.
4. The military forces of the signatory nations will assist each other whenever necessary.
5. Any negotiations with the Tehran Government will be conducted in the joint interest of the Azerbaijan and Kurdish national governments.
6. The Azerbaijan National Government will take the necessary steps to promote the use of the Kurdish language and the development of Kurdish culture among the Kurds of Azerbaijan, and the Kurdish National Government will take similar steps with regard to the Azerbaijanis living in Kurdistan.
7. Both signatory nations will take measures to punish any individual or

9: Roosevelt G-5 (1946-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
Mahabad

204 186 the Democrat Party of Kurdistan. The importance Qazi Mohammad attached to literature and the Kurdish language may be adduced from the presence on his staff of two young poets, Hazhar and Hieman, whose poems were published in spite of the paper shortage.

186 668 Although these efforts did not suffice during the republic's short life to bring it anywhere near the standard of the other two centers of Kurdish culture where Kurdish has been freely written and taught for twenty-five years, politically at least Mahabad was the focal point toward which all Kurdish eyes now were turned. In intellectual Kurdish circles in Beirut, Istanbul, and Baghdad, as well as among the wild mountains of western Asia, all were watching to see whether Qazi Mohammad would succeed or fail. Couriers brought communications to him from groups of Kurds not only in Iraq but in Syria and Turkey as well. His movement appealed especially to the young people, who felt that the older nationalist parties had not accomplished much. In Iraq, for instance, a new secret party, the leftist "Ruzgari," was formed of these elements.

ANTI-SOVIET SENTIMENT

668 186 • 177 The old nationalist parties, the Hewa in Iraq and the Khoybun in Syria, were not enthusiastic about Qazi Mohammad because of his Soviet connections. Fear and even hatred of the Soviets among the Kurds is strong for several reasons. In the first place, most Kurds are deeply religious and remain distrustful of the Soviet attitude toward religion. Furthermore, many of them have met refugees fresh from the Soviet Union or have talked to Moslems in the Red Army, few of whom paint a rosy picture of the lot of Oriental peoples under Soviet rule. It must also be remembered that the Russians have been traditional enemies of the Kurds since the days of the Tsars. Russian troops in World War I fought over a large part of Kurdistan, leaving a trail of ruin and depopulation still traceable in many Kurdish valleys and villages. In Mahabad itself, Russian troops had been under orders for several days to shoot anyone appearing in the streets, and the town was looted and burned. None of this has been erased from the long oriental memories of the Kurds, who still frighten their crying

9: Roosevelt G-5 (1946-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
Mahabad

children into silence by threatening them with the word "Russian."

The Soviets tried hard to counteract this unreceptive attitude. They played up "Kurdish autonomy" in the Soviet Union, and the brave deeds of one Samand Siamandov, Red Army colonel of Kurdish origin, "Hero of Leningrad." How much success they had is hard to judge, but certainly large sections of the population, as well as landlords, merchants, and religious leaders, continued to distrust them and to extend this distrust to Qazi Mohammad, whose connection with the Soviets was undeniable. The walls of the building in which his government was housed were plastered solidly with Soviet propaganda posters; his newspapers and magazines contained a large proportion of Soviet material translated word for word into Kurdish; and his poets composed panegyrics to Stalin and the Red Army.

Yet in contrast to the rest of Azerbaijan, Kurdistan was to outside appearances free of Soviet agents. Aside from a few Iransovtrans truck drivers, who acted as observers for the Soviet and pro-Soviet governments, Soviet citizens were almost unknown in the area and Soviet agents kept under cover. There was said to be a Soviet representative in residence in Mahabad, though his presence was denied by Kurdish authorities.[11] Hashumov, Soviet Consul in Rezaieh, and his assistant Aliakbarov made occasional trips to Mahabad.

While terrorism reigned unchecked in eastern Azerbaijan, in Kurdistan there were few if any political prisoners and only one or two cases of what may have been political assassination, though a number of Kurds not in sympathy with the regime did flee to Tehran. In the streets of Mahabad one could hear radio broadcasts from Ankara or London, while in Tabriz to listen to these brought the death penalty. Whether the reason for this freedom was the moderation and liberalism of Qazi and his cabinet, or the presence of the tribes who would not tolerate violent action against persons connected with them, the net result was to make the regime popular at least among the citizens of Mahabad, who enjoyed their respite from the exactions and oppression they

[11] The last of these Soviet advisers, one Asadov, is said to have been in Mahabad until the last days of the republic, when he fled to the Soviet Consulate in Tabriz.

Fr Roosevelt G-5 (1946-1947) 1947 MAII Kurd MAII
Mahabad

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641 considered to be characteristic of the central Iranian Government.

OPPOSITION OF THE TRIBES

If the Soviets kept their overt interference to a minimum in
249 order to reconcile the tribes to the regime, they were certainly un-
578 successful. In addition to historical, social, and religious reasons
668 for the tribes' opposition to the Soviet-supported government,
177 there were strong economic ones. The Kurdish tribesmen dependied largely on their tobacco crop for their livelihood, and now that their market in the rest of Iran was cut off they suffered considerable hardship. In certain areas food supplies already strained had to be shared with the destitute Barzanis, who had long outworn their welcome.

This tribal discontent was at its strongest in the south where the deceased Qaranei Agha's son, Mam Aziz, chief of the Mamesh, along with his ally, Bayazid Agha of the Mangur, so openly opposed Qazi Mohammad that the Soviet vice-consul finally came down from Rezaieh and threatened to have the Barzanis sent against them. When Mam Aziz continued to resist, the Barzanis did indeed attack him and he was forced to flee to Iraq with some of his tribesmen. From Rezaieh north, the tribes looked to the leadership of Amr Khan Shikak, who had resigned from his position in Qazi's government as minister of war and for the time being was keeping aloof in Zindasht, his mountain capital southwest of Shahpur. The only tribes Qazi Mohammad could count on were the Gawrik of Mahabad, numbering less than a thousand armed men, and part of the small tribe of Zerza, in the Ushnuieh region. Even Mulla Mustafa and his Barzanis did not get on with Qazi Mohammad, who was no longer able to feed them.

668 Thus it was that Qazi Mohammad, in the face of the increasingly aggressive attitude of the Tehran Government, found himself almost without support. Despite Soviet promises of aid and matériel, in the fall of 1946 Qazi Mohammad was still without either heavy weapons or trained men, or indeed any effective army at all. As Iranian preparations became increasingly obvious, Qazi sent frantic messages to the tribes, his only hope, say-

R Roosevelt G-S (1946-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
Mahabad

668 wishing to incur obligations, had not informed Amr Khan of its projected move into Azerbaijan, and so by the time he had gathered his tribesmen to attack the Democrats, the war was over. Amr Khan and the other chiefs quickly sent the Iranian commander professions of loyalty. All were accepted back in the fold except Zero Beg, whose tribesmen ambushed some Iranian soldiers in Balanesh, near Rezaieh, while he was conferring there with General Homayuni. Zero consequently had to flee, accompanied by a few tribesmen and Assyrians, to Ushnuieh, where he found Mulla Mustafa and his Barzanis in a state of precarious truce with the Central Government. The Mulla finally refused the government's order to disarm his tribesmen or return to Iraq, and fighting broke out again. By June 1947 the Barzanis had fought their way north to Maku and seemed about to cross the border into the Soviet Union.

IN SUMMARY

• 177 186 668 This latest attempt to found a Kurdish state ended with the Iranian occupation of Mahabad. Like previous attempts it failed largely because of disunity among the Kurds themselves. One of the dilemmas of Kurdish nationalism is that while not only its leaders, but nearly all its rank and file, must come from the more enlightened townspeople, its military strength has always had to come from the tribes and their chiefs, with neither the education nor the imagination to look for anything but gain and loot in the weakening of government authority. During 1946 the Kurdish tribes, naturally opposed to government control, felt as restive under Qazi Mohammad as they had under the Central Government, even though he was of their own race. Because of this feeling, as well as their distrust of Qazi's Soviet connections, the tribes almost all sided with the Iranian army.

The principal immediate reason for the collapse of the republic was the failure of Soviet support to materialize. A young and strong nationalist party which might have united a majority of educated Kurds was infiltrated by foreigners who used it for their own purposes and then let it be destroyed. The miniature state had been built under the protection of the Red Army, and continued to exist after its evacuation only because of the possibility

Roosevelt G-S (1946-1947) 1947 MA11 Kurd MA11
Mahabad

of its return. When the Kurds no longer hoped for this, and the Iranians no longer feared it, there was no chance for Qazi Mohammad's movement to survive.

The whole episode was a serious blow to the development of Kurdish nationalism. There is now no Komala and no Democrat Party of Kurdistan, and many of the potential leaders of the Kurds are dead, in prison, or in exile. Yet this does not mean that Kurdish nationalism is finished. The Kurdish Republic found its support among those progressive elements of the population which seem bound to increase in numbers and importance, and was opposed by those elements which seem destined to disappear. It remains to be seen whether Kurdish nationalism is practical in an area where, until recently, nationalism was an unknown conception and men still give primary allegiance to their religious and tribal chiefs. The Kurds have never been combined in a stable state of their own and enjoy no ancient unifying culture. Separated from each other by mountain barriers, they have always had to look for their cultural and economic needs to the capitals of the different states in which they have lived.

If the states the Kurds inhabit allow their Kurdish populations a degree of local autonomy and give up the attempt to force an alien nationalism upon them, they may succeed in obtaining a loyalty similar to that found in Switzerland with its multinational population. The Arab countries have made a start in this direction. A similar policy in Iran, if left free of foreign penetration, might be a cause of closer unity rather than of separatism between two of the nation's peoples.

• 177 of the modern East, he displays a lack of enthusiasm which his more 'progressive' neighbours cannot understand, and he is classed as bovine and wooden-headed. On the other hand, if allowed to develop quietly in his own way, he readily adapts himself to the new world springing up around him.

439 177 With the coming of the townsmen, motor roads, and organized forces to keep the peace in the country, trade has begun to improve in Kurdistan. When it no longer pays to raid, the Kurds take to trade—being traders by nature like the Scots. Foreign 'luxuries', such as the new coloured cloths, tea, and sugar, have quickly become necessities even in the remotest districts, and to obtain the wherewithal to purchase them the Kurd is compelled to cultivate for sale as well as for food.

439 661 Now that caravans can come to the towns without hindrance from those through whose territory they pass, instead

[text continues on p. 58A]

14: Ivanov E-6 (no date) 1926 MA1 Iran MA1
Kurd MA11

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now remain; there are only a few degenerate and impoverished families in the south of the province, constituting a starving nomad tribe.

The Turks are still numerous, and there are many invaders of quite recent origin, such as the Kurds, who came here in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Timanis and the Baluchis, who extended their wanderings further and further north. The latest immigrants are Mongols, the so-called Barbaris, or Hazara, who are still continuing to come in numbers. It will be better to deal with each tribe separately.

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Kurds.—It is difficult to find if any Kurdish tribes were living in Khurasan before the beginning of the sixteenth century. In the surnames of many different celebrities who are natives of this province the term "Kurt" is often met with. Even a dynasty of this name ruled south of Herat in the hill districts (643–791 A.H., or 1245–1389 A.D.). Kurd and Kurt are undoubtedly the same as they are to-day; but if there had been some Kurdish people in Khurasan, they must have mixed with
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Persians. When under the Safawides the necessity arose of defending the northern frontier of Khurasan against the inroads of the powerful Uzbegs and Turkomans, local means were not sufficient, and the Shahs tried to institute a measure similar to that of the Cossacks in Russia, *i.e.* they settled some warlike and virile people in the threatened area. Therefore some tribes of Kurds from Kurdistan proper were transferred
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as early as the middle of the sixteenth century. In the beginning of the
● 177
seventeenth century a new party had arrived; some of these tribes still live there, like the Kaiwanlu, the Shadillu, etc. Some more of them arrived later on in the eighteenth century, under Nadir (like the 'Amarlu). At present there is no connection with the West, and the Khurasani Kurds are gradually undergoing "Turkomanization."

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With regard to the racial and tribal names, it may be observed that they are utterly unreliable for the purpose of establishing any conclusions to ethnical connections. The tribe is usually called after the surname of the chief or of the place of settlement, and very soon the whole of the tribe, to which several sub-divisions belong, becomes named after the section which was most prominent and important among them. In practice there is nothing more difficult than obtaining exact information of the name of a tribe with its sub-divisions. In Khurasan the difficulty is still greater because there are no distinct sub-dialects, and the idiom of the Kurds appears practically uniform. Many sub-sections are closely connected with the Turks, and experience real difficulty in deciding whether they are of Kurdish or Turkish nationality.

These continual changes of names make it difficult to draw up a systematic table of sub-division. Of the four tribes which are traditionally regarded as the original, namely 'Amarlu, Za'faranlu, Shadillu and Kaiwanlu, the first and last appear to-day as small tribes, while the other two are mostly Turkish-speaking and have ceased to be regarded as Kurds.
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The following list gives an approximate idea as to the present principal

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Kurd MA 11

Kurdish State and not communist. It existed for only nine months, despite the Treaty of Alliance for twenty years which it had concluded with another Soviet-sponsored government, the autonomous administration of Persian Azerbaidzhan.

Even such short-lived experiments as the Kurdish Republic of 1946 can become an important factor in the national tradition of a people, who, like the Kurds, are living under foreign rule. Experiments of that kind are apt to create a myth which ultimately may have a greater impact on the national development of the people than the original event itself. From year to year the Kurdish Republic of Quazi Mohammed may appear to the Kurds more splendid and more powerful, particularly if Soviet propaganda does its share by reminding the Kurds of the downfall of 'their' republic and recalling the part which Russia played in its foundation. Soviet propaganda is indeed taking every opportunity of referring back to the glorious times when two pictures decorated the walls of the houses of many a Kurdish sheikh – that of Quazi Mohammed, the Kurdish leader, hanged by the Persians in March 1947, and that of Generalissimo Stalin.[56]

Despite the collapse of 'Free Kurdistan' Soviet Russia has nevertheless made great progress in mastering the Kurdish problem. Kurdish chieftains became acquainted with Soviet institutions and Soviet ideology while the Russian occupation of Persia's Kurdish territories lasted. Many Persian Kurds joined their countrymen already living in Soviet Transcaucasia and Kurdish culture 'national in form and socialist in content' developed: 200 Kurdish pamphlets and books had been published in the Soviet Union by 1949.[57] Nor was there any shortage of qualified Kurdish personnel in the Soviet Union after the war. On the contrary, Soviet propaganda was able to boast of Kurdish 'state dignitaries and outstanding workers in culture and science', who had sprung up among the Russian Kurds. A Kurdish Soviet poet, Amin Avdal, is the 'author of wonderful verses on the Soviet homeland'. Another Kurdish poet, Jasmeh Jalil, translated Russian classics into his native tongue. A Kurdish philologist, Nure Pulatova, a graduate of Leningrad University, became the only Kurdish woman scholar in the world.[58] And lastly, between 1946 and 1950 the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. included a Kurdish deputy, Samand Alievich Siabandov.

However important the recent Soviet experiments with the Russian Kurds may be, the latter represent not even 5 per cent of the entire Kurdish people. Soviet Russia must bring either the Turkish or the Persian Kurds within her orbit if she wants to make a success of her 'Kurdish policy'. It remains to be seen whether the political dynamic of the U.S.S.R. and the ideological power of Bolshevism will be sufficient to accomplish this aim.